Consultation launched by Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service

The consultation is now open on their website, but beware of their claims and statements.

The Dark Art of Spin

Some examples of how Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service is trying to spin cuts as improvements, with some added responses.

Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service still living up to their new name

Well sorry Peter Bond, I don't think anyone believes that closing 8 fire stations, cutting 16 fire engines, 
cutting between 200 and 250 firefighter posts, mothballing 8 or 14 fire engines during the day, 
and reallocating just one fire engine will make anything better.

Vital information missing from Chief Fire Officer's report

The Chief Fire Officer's report to the Fire Authority mentions the Fire Services Emergency Cover Toolkit, which is used to model the effects of any resource changes, but he has not included the all important results. Used properly, the modelling can be used to compare the effects of each option with current figures for deaths and property damage, so that the consequences of change are fully understood. Figures can be produced to show increases or decreases for the service as a whole and for each station area.

Other Chief Fire Officers have tried to bury, or make difficult to understand, the extra death and increased property damage results from this modelling, but Lee Howell seems to be the first to try and keep them secret. It is not acceptable to hide them from the public and from Fire Authority Members.

The report also misleads by not giving the full figures for each station’s workload, which means the full extent of the consequences is hidden. Figures for incidents attended in other station areas, attendance at incidents as relief crew, standbys at other stations and co-responder calls should be included in all the tables. 

Much is made in the report of prevention activity, but no mention is made of how much prevention and community safety activity will be lost as a result of the cuts at affected stations. Attendance at community events, visits to schools etc., are valuable prevention and safety opportunities. That loss needs to be set against any gain that may, or may not, result from some of the changes. A significant increase in prevention activity may be hoped for, but the report is lacking in detail of how that will be achieved and at what cost.

Strange Logic 

Some of the claimed figures in the report seem illogical. For example, in option 1, they claim closing 8 fire stations and removing over 90 firefighter posts will save money. I understand that, but how will that also increase Fire Safety Checks by over 3,000? Saying “Potential increase” in Fire Safety Checks is not good enough, some detail and costings must be provided to support the figures. 

The concept of prevention and protection activity making everyone safer is an attractive one, but doing so by reducing response resources, and thereby increasing response times, is foolhardy. There is no evidence that increasing prevention and protection activity will save lives, but plenty of evidence that longer response times increase the number of deaths and the cost of property damage. We hope prevention will save lives, but it is not measurable. 

Wishing and hoping prevention will save lives is not 

justification for removing fire crews that do save lives.

Roving can only work with an accurate crystal ball

Option 6 would see six additional 'roving' fire engines during the day, although details of how they will be used are sketchy. They talk about moving them to areas where, for example, "we typically have a number of accidents at particular times of the day on particular roads". They even admitted on Facebook that they don't have a crystal ball, but arrogantly claim, "robust analysis is the next best thing". It is not. No amount of analysis will tell them where and when the next emergency will be. It only tells them about incidents they have attended in the past. Fires and accidents can occur anywhere and at anytime, so there will be many more occasions when 'roving' fire engines are not nearby, than occasions when they will be.

The number of calls deception

The Chief Fire Officer claims that less calls justifies these cuts, but fails to mention that demand has never been used to determine the number of fire engines required. If fire service resources had been increased as calls increased then, even allowing for recent reductions, the service would have far more resources than it does now. 

Proper resource allocation is based on having a spread of resources to ensure a speedy and effective response to every emergency call, a speedy and effective response to assistance calls for larger incidents, and to ensure a high volume of calls in an area can be attended simultaneously. Severe weather events often result in numerous calls at the same time and climate change is increasing the scale and frequency of such events. 

Demand is only a factor in determining if a fire engine needs to be crewed by On Call Firefighters, for lower demand, or by Wholetime Firefighters for higher demand.

Every fire station is attending more emergency calls than when Chief Fire Officers, Councillors and the Home Office first approved the establishment of the current stations in 1948. Since then, despite emergency calls increasing significantly, before dropping back to levels well above those in 1948, the number of front-line fire engines in Devon & Somerset has never been increased. They have only ever been reduced.

There are around 3 fires in people's homes and over 50 other fires and emergencies every day in Devon and Somerset. There is no way of knowing where the next one will be, so resources must be maintained across the area.

Each 'X' on this map represents a fire engine permanently removed, or not available during the day, under option 5 of Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service's latest scheme.

It is also concerning that in the report, in interviews and on social media, unsubstantiated claims and statements are being made by Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service. Spin and speculation should have no place in an organisation that professes to be honest, open and accountable. 

Incredibly, when I pointed out that they were misusing the term 'risk', they admitted my definition was right. So why do they keep talking about 'low risk' when all they really mean is that an area or station has less incidents than other areas. The risk of anyone losing their life in a fire or crash, or losing their home or business, is the same wherever they are. 

What Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service is really saying is, "if there are lots of emergencies in your area, then we will attend quickly, but if there are not, then we won't. To ensure we take longer to get to areas with less emergencies, we will remove your nearest fire station or fire engines from that station". 

About as responsible as a motorist saying, "I wear my seat belt on that road because there were ten serious crashes on it last year, but I don't wear it on this road because there were only two".   

This lengthy report is packed with statistics, some helpful some not, but it is missing crucial information.

The Fire Authority must not keep that information secret, it must be released before the consultation.

Office for National Statistics ignores true value of our fire & rescue services

Yesterday's report, “Activities, spending and productivity in the Fire and Rescue Services since 2009”, from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), clearly shows how distorted thinking is undermining our fire & rescue services.

They claim to be independent of politics, but the claim looks somewhat suspect when the report suggests that cuts have improved productivity. They also claim to be the “recognised national statistical institute of the UK”. Well perhaps they are competent when it comes to business statistics, but when it comes to the fire & rescue service they clearly don’t have a clue.

They apply a simplistic business test of looking at inputs (cost of provision) and outputs (quantity produced), which they perceive for fire & rescue to be operational and prevention activity. They then crudely claim, because activity cuts are not as bad as staff cuts, that productivity has improved.

Home Office figures

The fundamental schoolboy error in this approach is that fire & rescue is not a business, but a form of insurance that both reduces mishaps and disasters, and minimises their effects when they do occur. If they properly assessed outputs, they would assess the financial benefit of lives not being lost and property not being destroyed as a result of FRS activity. Sadly, something this national statistical institute appears incapable of doing.

Now it may be difficult, but proper research could identify the value of lives and property saved at incidents by the FRS. Identifying the value of lives and property saved by prevention activity, i.e. losses avoided because incidents were avoided, may be more challenging, but a “recognised national statistical institute” ought to be able to estimate this. Yet they have not even tried to do so.

The real value of the service is what is saved and prevented, not how many incidents or inspections are carried out. I have no doubt that if these fundamental outputs were properly calculated, then the service would be shown to be very productive and very good value.

Of course, that would also show that cuts to the service are counterproductive, with the cost of the consequences being much greater than the actual saving on service provision. The ONS may consider themselves to be non-political, but their inept assessment is helping austerity politicians to falsely claim damaging cuts as productivity improvements.

If the ONS want their statistics on fire & rescue to be taken seriously, then they need to properly value the full benefit that fire and rescue services contribute to public safety and the economy.     

Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service blunders on

It seems that Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s leadership is incapable of learning from their mistakes, or of complying with the law. They are clearly desperate to cover up their failings and poor decision making by any means possible.

This week a ruling confirmed that they failed to comply with the Freedom of Information Act, and last week there was another move in the continuing cover up regarding the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel in Exeter.

No risk assessments for Really Inadequate Vehicle policy

The Information Commissioner has now ruled that Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service breached sections 10 and 17 of the Freedom of Information Act, in relation to a request for information about their decision to provide some communities with less capable fire engines.

The Commissioner has ordered D&SF&RS to provide missing and redacted information within 35 days and, if they fail to do so, the matter could be referred to the High Court to be dealt with as a contempt of court.

Included in the information they have been trying to keep secret are the risk assessments that should have been completed before they replaced well equipped fire engines with vehicles that are far less effective.

D&SF&RS regularly claim that resources are being matched to risk, but they refuse to provide copies of their risk assessments. In particular, how they assessed the risk of replacing well equipped fire engines with vehicles that are far less effective.

So, either they have not carried out proper risk assessments, 

or there are serious risks they don’t want the public or firefighters to know about.

Royal Clarence Hotel

The Information Commissioner has yet to rule on D&SF&RS’s failure to provide information that would allow scrutiny of their actions at the Cathedral Yard fire.  The information was requested last September. Now, presumably to try and placate the Commissioner, they have belatedly released a version of the Fire Control Incident Log. Unfortunately, as so much of the detail useful for scrutiny has been redacted, it tells us very little.

Information they want to keep secret includes: 

• Details of which fire engines were sent, when they were sent, how long they took to arrive, when they left the incident, and how many firefighters were on them.
• Significant detail in messages between the control room and the incident that give details of the extent of the fire and what action the crews were taking.
• Some assistance messages redacted completely and detail missing in others.
• The names of officers taking decisions and in overall command of the incident at different times.

The public and firefighters have legitimate concerns

BBC Inside Out South West

To justify keeping this information secret they are misusing an exemption in the legislation that is intended to protect information related to law enforcement. It is quite ludicrous to claim that, for example, information on what time the fire engine from Dawlish was sent to the incident “would, or would be likely to, prejudice” .. “the exercise by any public authority of its functions for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of an accident.” 

It would be laughable, if this were not such a serious matter.

Clearly aware how weak their justification is, they have produced an additional document in which they try to suggest that this information would help “those with malicious intent” and is necessary to “protect the Service and wider society from potential crime”. Once again utterly ludicrous. Hiding this information is not in the public interest, but the Chief Fire Officer must think it is in his interest.

Having worked with security sensitive information and discussed policies with the police, security services and the Cabinet Office, I fully understand the need to be cautious about information that might be useful to terrorists. 

However, information on how the service managed, or mismanaged, 

a fire nearly three years ago is of no use to terrorists whatsoever.

Mr Nobody did it

Those who are parents will be familiar with children’s denials when they have done something wrong. It seems D&SF&RS are following that example by removing names from documents, so that we have no idea who was responsible for anything.

They did eventually disclose the name of the most senior person responsible for two of the vehicle related documents, but not for all of them. So, for no legitimate reason, the names of some project managers and of those who reviewed or approved the reports are kept secret.

Astonishingly they claim this was because they “believed that there may be inappropriate contact and naming of these individuals in the media, due to the way in which its responses had been used in the past. Disclosure of the information about these third parties could clearly have very detrimental consequences.”

They don’t explain what “detrimental consequences” or “inappropriate contact” they are referring to, or provide any evidence to support their claim about past use of their responses, or even why they describe their own employees as "third parties". Critics of the changes have not contacted any individual employee - appropriately, or inappropriately. 

It all points to the real reason being that they don’t like 

anyone asking awkward questions or criticising their decisions

D&SF&RS need to understand that if they require their managers to make inaccurate and misleading claims in interviews, press releases and on social media, in an effort to justify dangerous cuts to the service, those claims have to be challenged. Do they really expect us to believe that fire service managers, who have risked life and limb, are going to dissolve in to tears when someone challenges what they said, or asks difficult questions?

D&SF&RS put them in that position, not those campaigning to stop dangerous changes. 

In the case of the Royal Clarence Hotel log, all the names have been removed from the released Fire Control log. So, apparently, we are not to be told who was in overall charge of the incident at any stage. 

You have to wonder, if they did such a good job, why they don’t want their names associated with the incident.

The exemptions in the legislation were never intended to allow people, who are paid by taxpayers to protect the public, to hide their activities under a cloak of anonymity. D&SF&RS claims to be open, honest and accountable, yet these actions demonstrate it is not. Compounding the secrecy and cover up by trying to deceive the Information Commissioner with spurious claims is equally irresponsible.

Until the fire authority ensures this information is put fully in the public domain,

the service will sadly remain the Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service.

An Honest Fire & Rescue Service or a

The cover up continues

Those concerned with the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter on 28 October 2016, which resulted in the loss of the historic Royal Clarence Hotel, have been trying to get answers. A Freedom of Information request for copies of incident logs and other recorded information was submitted last September by respected fire safety consultant Alan Cox. Instead of providing copies of the documents within the required 20 working days, the request was met with delays and excuses.

One disturbing excuse in November was, “the main subject experts are no longer employees.” You don’t need former employees to copy reports or to redact exempt material from documents and records. They went on to say, “one of them is coming in next week to assist”. Assist with what, removing details from the reports, adding detail that should have been recorded at the time, or altering the reports to cover up failures? Such actions would not only be inappropriate, they would be illegal.

Finally, at the beginning of this month, one document has now been provided. Not, however, scans of the original Fire Ground Event & Decision Log that was completed during the incident, but a typed transcript. When questioned, the sender is only able to say that she "understands" it to be "a direct copy”. Following the earlier reference to a former employee coming in to assist, concerns are heightened that, instead of an exact copy, this is just a sanitised version.

Despite Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s claim to be open, responsible and accountable, they have redacted all the names in the log. It is not acceptable to shield publicly employed managers from public scrutiny by misusing exemptions that are designed to protect people from unreasonable intrusion in to their private lives. That was never the intention of the Data Protection Act, or the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act.  

We are only talking about the names of these publicly employed officials, not their age, home address, or other genuinely personal data. These names would be made public if there was a court case, inquest or public inquiry, so why not now? Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service happily publish the names of personnel in press releases and on their website for positive stories, so why are they hiding these names? There is no justification, and this secrecy only reinforces concerns that, instead of learning from their failings, they want to cover them up.

Fire Ground Event & Decision Log

So, what does the only document provided so far tell us? It tells us that plans for the Royal Clarence Hotel were being sent to the incident at 08:24, which is more than 3 hours after the first fire engine arrived. That raises several questions, including why were plans for this historic building, with a significant life risk, not available on fire engines and why had they not been requested much earlier? It also suggests that someone still had concerns about the fire affecting the hotel, even though reports indicate that, at the same time, the hotel was not being properly checked for fire spread and that resources were being released from the incident.

Even more concerning, at 09:45, the record of the inter-agency meeting says that the fire was “now contained” and that the risk assessment had “taken into account fire spread at roof level”. Crucially, there was no mention of fire spreading to the Royal Clarence Hotel in the list of risks still being considered. 

Astonishingly, at 09:40, it records just 2 breathing apparatus sets, one aerial appliance and one firefighting jet in use. Photos then show that, shortly after, the aerial appliance was no longer in action. It is also unclear, if this is an exact copy of the original, how the 09:40 log entry was recorded after the 09:45 entry.

Despite the apparent confidence that the fire was contained and would not spread, less than 20 minutes later, large volumes of smoke are rising from the roof of the Royal Clarence Hotel. It is also more than five hours after firefighters were first called to the incident. Resources that had been released are called back and additional resources have to be requested. Firefighters universally regard having to ask for additional resources, after they have been sent away, as a cardinal sin indicating poor decision making and assessment. Exactly what resources had been released from the incident too early is not shown in this log, which is why it is important for the control room log to be produced. 

International Fire Protection magazine

The missing documents

It is quite clear that the control room log is one of the documents that they don’t want to be made public. Eight months after these documents were requested, they are now making the excuse that the Monitoring Officer needs to consider if they are exempt under section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act. This is undoubtedly a last-ditch attempt to keep this information from public scrutiny, as that section is primarily intended to protect information about sensitive Government negotiations. For other public bodies it is only about disclosure that might prejudice “the effective conduct of public affairs.”

Key to legitimate use of this exemption is the public interest test. It is painfully obvious that understanding why there was such a catastrophic failure at this incident, despite the magnificent work of so many firefighters, is very much in the public interest. Not least to ensure such failures do not occur in the future. Section 36 is not there to frustrate scrutiny, or to serve the personal interest of individuals.

If section 36 is used to withhold information, then it will effectively be an admission that 

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service has something to hide

It is rather like a drink driver refusing to be tested. They know they are over the limit, the police know they are over the limit, the courts know they are over the limit, but they just want to hide exactly how much over the limit they are.

The fake review of the Cathedral Yard fire

In January, Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service announced a review of the Cathedral Yard fire by the National Fire Chiefs Council, which they claimed would provide “an independent view from people who understand operational tactics”. However, the review by West Midlands Fire & Rescue Service has been told by Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service to only review the methods used to compile the original report. A much criticised report that had recommendations for others, but none for Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service.

By mentioning operational tactics, it appears they hoped to give the impression that it was a full review of the incident. However, as Assistant Chief Fire Officer Peter Bond confirmed in correspondence with the Fire Brigades Union, “It is not a review of the actual incident or any operational tactics.” He also says that the review was requested "following allegations that were made in the media", but the limitations they have imposed prevent any review of tactics and actions that are at the heart of those allegations.

Mr Bond also refused to allow the FBU to be involved with the process, other than to accompany any FBU member who wanted support when interviewed. Another indication that they did not want a full and open investigation. Surprising and worrying when Mr Bond is supposed to be the Director of Service Improvement.

The FBU raised several concerns after the fire, but none of these were included in the whitewash report. Other professionals and the victims of the fire share those concerns. I understand that the review team carried out interviews with selected personnel at the end of March, but a review report has yet to appear. It will be interesting to see if West Midlands Chief Fire Officer Phil Loach decides to support a fellow Chief Fire Officer's whitewash, or if he will make it clear that he is unable to properly address the many genuine concerns about the handling of this fire.

This is not about finding people to punish for any failings, it is about understanding what went wrong, why it went wrong, and taking action to stop similar failures in the future. 

If the Fire & Rescue Authority genuinely cares about public safety it will make the requested documents public

and ensure that a full and truly independent investigation is carried out.

Claiming these values is meaningless
when your actions demonstrate the opposite

Your firefighters and the public deserve better

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service shooting themselves in the foot

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service think that introducing Rapid Intervention Vehicles (RIVs) and sending them to emergencies with less than four firefighters will improve the service’s response times.

Yet there are many flaws in this idea, not least the long term effect it may have on the recruitment and retention of on call firefighters. Something Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service has clearly not considered.

To illustrate this, let’s look at the questions a potential recruit ought to ask before joining a station with a Rapid Intervention Vehicle, together with the candid answers a senior officer should give:

"What will I be expected to do?"

"When you are on call, you will need to leave home, or work, at a moments notice to respond to a wide range of fires and other emergencies."

"I expect you will provide the best equipped type of fire engine to help me do the job safely and effectively?"

"No, to save money we are replacing many well equipped fire engines with RIVs that carry less equipment and much less water. That unfortunately means you will run out of water quicker."

"But we can still get water from hydrants can’t we?"

"Sometimes, but we have cut the amount of hose on RIVs, so unless the hydrant is very near you will be left with no water to fight the fire."

"But if there is a stream, pond or swimming pool nearby we can get water from there can’t we?"

"Only if your RIV can get very close to the water. If not, you will have to wait until a portable pump arrives from another station."

"Will we have foam for tackling oil and petrol fires?"

"No, you will have to wait until help arrives from another station."

"Will we have ladders to help us rescue people and extinguish fires?"

"Yes, provided that the building is not too high and you don’t need to get on the roof. If you need a 10.5 or 13.5 metre ladder, or a roof ladder, then you will have to wait until help arrives from another station."

"Will we have other essential equipment?"

"A little, but for some essential equipment you will have to wait for it to arrive from one of the increasingly few fire stations that still have proper fire engines."

"When you say help arrives from another station, how quickly will that help arrive?"

"You may have heard some of my colleagues talk about twenty minutes, and one even suggested ten minutes, which is highly unlikely for most rural stations. The truth is that it could be quite a while, especially when the next nearest station is unavailable because they don’t have a crew, or the crew is attending another incident." 

An illustration of poor availability that delays help arriving

"I will always have several experienced firefighters to support me won't I?"

"Sometimes, but our latest cunning plan is to send you out with less colleagues on the crew than are needed to enable you to take safe and effective action at anything other than very small emergencies."

"Will I still be able to go in to buildings wearing breathing apparatus to rescue people?"

"No, you will have to wait until help arrives . It would be far too dangerous to go in without support."  

"But if people see a trained firefighter not going in, they will be angry and think I am a coward."

"Yes, but we will issue a statement saying you were not allowed to do that."

"They may still give me grief on social media and when I see them in the street."

"Yes, but you did agree to put yourself in this position."

"Why are you taking these shortcuts?"

"We have failed to recruit and retain enough firefighters to properly crew our fire engines, so if we send a couple of firefighters on the RIV we might fool the public in to believing we are doing our job properly."

"But what about safety legislation?"

"There is no safe system of work for less than four firefighters, so we leave it up to you to ‘volunteer’ to operate with less."

"Doesn’t that leave me at greater risk?"

"Well most firefighters, fire & rescue services, former Home Office inspectors and the unions think so, but we just want to get a vehicle to incidents so we can claim we met our response time."

"So those unsafe systems might result in me suffering serious injury or death?"

"Well yes, but don’t worry if that happens your officer-in-charge is likely to be disciplined or prosecuted and in the worst case might be sent to prison for manslaughter."

"Might I be prosecuted under the Health & Safety at Work Act?"

"Well the legislation does oblige you to take care of your own health and safety and that of others who may be affected by what you do. So if you do something that puts anyone in danger, then you could be."

"Would the Fire Authority be prosecuted?"

"Well possibly, but we will put as much blame as possible on the crew for taking unnecessary risks and not assessing the situation properly. In any case, if we did end up being fined we aren't worried as it will be taxpayers footing the bill."

"Don’t you as senior managers worry about that?"

"Not really, we are keeping our fingers crossed and hope that by the time something serious does go wrong we will have retired or moved to another fire & rescue service."

"So, do you still want to join?"

Chief Fire Officer's failing commitment

Senior D&SF&RS officers have repeatedly stated that the crewing policy for fire appliances, a minimum crew of four, will apply to the Rapid Intervention Vehicles (RIVs). The minimum crewing policy is vital to ensure that firefighters are able to carry out actions effectively and without avoidable risk. 

Despite this, it has emerged that Dartmouth firefighters, who clearly lack confidence in their less well equipped RIV, feel obliged to take their fully equipped fire engine (MRP) to every incident as well. They are even doing this when they don't have enough firefighters to crew them both properly. According to their social media posts, instead of at least four on each, they are responding with just two on the RIV and three on the MRP. 

Much as I sympathise with the predicament that Dartmouth's firefighters now find themselves in, such actions are misguided. There is no safe system of work for such practices and it not only exposes firefighters to unnecessary risk, but it also exposes those in charge to the risk of prosecution under safety legislation.

Inadequate procedures and ignoring procedures costs lives

Astonishingly, if official D&SF&RS social media sites are to be believed, not only is the Chief Fire Officer allowing this abuse of crewing and safety policies, he is actively encouraging it. Eighteen years ago the Home Office inspected Devon Fire & Rescue Service and said that allowing just three firefighters to crew a fire appliance exposed them to additional and avoidable risk. The service was unable to come up with a safe system of work for that practice, so it was stopped and the minimum crew on a front-line fire appliance was determined to be four. 

Over the last 70 years there have been many changes to the two fire appliances stationed at Dartmouth. During that time they always had enough confidence in those appliances to take just one to those emergencies that only needed one crew. That they now feel obliged to take their MRP, whenever the RIV is sent out, simply confirms that the RIV is a "Really Inadequate Vehicle". 

It is also worth noting that they have the benefit of having a MRP available on their station. Other communities, such as Porlock and Princetown, do not. They, and others to follow, will only have an inadequate RIV for protection.   

The Chief Fire Officer's actions are illustrating that this commitment is increasingly hollow:

Protection for selected communities is being downgraded

Staff are being exposed to additional and avoidable danger

New vehicles are less well equipped

Some firefighters are to be less well trained. 

New allocations revealed

Despite assurances that allocations would be publicised as soon as they were decided, it seems that news of the latest allocations was confined to an internal newsletter earlier this month. The following stations are to lose a fire engine and have it replaced by a RIV:

Budleigh Salterton, Chard, Newton Abbot, Okehampton, Shepton Mallet, Tavistock, Williton and Woolacombe. 

Budleigh Salterton and Woolacombe will not have another appliance on their station, so will have to wait for help from stations further away.

Those communities may be a little reassured with the promise that longer ladders are to be carried on RIVs, but the other inadequacies remain:

56% less water, 50% less hose reel, 50% less 70mm diameter hose, 
30% less 45mm diameter hose, 25% less breathing apparatus sets, and 25% less suction hose.

No portable pump, which can be vital for firefighting in rural areas
 where hydrants are few and far between and for pumping out flooded properties.

No foam, which is essential for flammable liquid fires.

No positive pressure fan, which is invaluable for clearing smoke to aid rescue and firefighting.

The spin continues

That internal update for staff revealed that they have now decided to carry longer ladders on the RIVs. That is to be welcomed, but unfortunately the update continues with more misleading spin.

They say the decision, “Follows feedback from staff and members of the public”.

There was clear feedback from firefighters before the first vehicles were put in to use, but their concerns were ignored. Failing to listen to those who will have to use these vehicles, and simply reacting to public pressure suggests inept management.

“Data has shown that rescues using ladders have become extremely rare.“

It doesn’t matter how rare they are, data cannot predict where or when they will be needed. Depriving some communities of proper ladders would have put lives at risk. 

“The locations of RIVs are being decided using a risk based approach to ensure they are at the most suitable locations to provide the best service to the communities they serve.”

D&SF&RS have failed to provide any documentation to support their claim, despite receiving a legitimate freedom of information request. With missing and reduced levels of equipment and water, the RIVs will not provide a ‘best service’ to any community. The public in the affected communities deserve to know why they are having their protection downgraded.

“Locally based officers were involved in the decisions on the most effective locations for the new vehicles to be sited.”

How local? Are they saying the officer-in-charge of each of the stations concerned agreed to having a less capable RIV in place of a proper fire engine? I am afraid ‘involved in the decisions’, does not mean they were listened to, or were happy with the decisions made at Headquarters.

“Research suggests RIVs can respond more quickly than Medium Rescue Pumps (MRPs) in certain conditions.”

Again no evidence has been produced to support this claim, but a minute or two quicker in certain conditions is not going to make up for not having enough water or the right equipment.

“They will carry the latest technology such as fog spike, which enables firefighting to start from outside a building, and electronic cutting equipment.”

This has nothing to do with the vehicle, as the latest technology could be carried on proper, fully equipped fire engines.

“RIVs are significantly cheaper to purchase than MRPs and Light Rescue Pumps (LRPs).”

Here we have the real reason for the change, saving money regardless of the effect on public or firefighter safety. 

It is also unclear if this will be cheaper in the long run. Other fire services using van based vehicles for specialist roles have found they are less robust and have to be replaced more frequently than full sized fire appliances. They also suffer more from the stresses and strains of fire service use, so breakdown more often and can need costly repairs.

“The RIV project has been based on a large amount of data which has shown where the appliances should be located and what equipment they should carry.”

Information to support that claim has not been provided and does not appear to exist. In any event, incident data is not a foolproof indicator of the requirement for future incidents. This data preoccupation demonstrates a fundamental project failure to remember that any type of incident can occur, and any equipment may be needed, anywhere and at any time. Depriving firefighters of the equipment they may need to save lives and property in selected communities cannot be justified.

Referring to the testing programme they say, “most people who see it are impressed by its capability”.

Compared to some of the even less well equipped small van/light 4x4 vehicles that were evaluated, it will obviously appear better. However. that does not mean they consider it a proper replacement for a fully equipped fire engine. The real concern is not the things the RIV is capable of, it is the things it is not capable of that concerns firefighters and should concern the public.

All communities in Devon & Somerset deserve proper protection from their Fire Authority, 

it should not just be provided for the fortunate ones.