Report confirms cover up but DSFRS still in denial

Cuts reduced but some will wait longer for help to arrive

I was going to comment on the National Fire Chiefs Council investigation of the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter earlier, but decided not to distract from the fight to stop the damaging cuts proposed by the Chief Fire Officer. The Fire & Rescue Authority decision was disappointing, as it will still result in some people having to wait longer for help to arrive. That the cuts were not worse had much to do with the steadfast efforts of local campaigners who exposed the misinformation and inaccuracies from Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service.

BBC News

Campaigners must continue to monitor developments to make sure cuts are not sneaked back in, and the Authority must ensure that the Chief Fire Officer honours his improvement assurances. Many of them seemed little more than wishful thinking, so it will be interesting to see if claims about more prevention cutting the number of incidents and deaths actually materialise. 

It will also be interesting to see if availability and response times actually improve, as the latest national data shows they are progressively getting worse. The Chief Fire Officer must not be allowed to falsely claim improvement by using figures for inadequately crewed stations and appliances. 

For statistical purposes, a fire station with less than

four firefighters available must not be counted as available

First appliance response times must not be shown as met

until at least four firefighters have arrived at an incident

Unfortunately, we can't rely on the Fire & Rescue Authority to hold the Chief Fire Officer to account, so everyone needs to stay alert. The failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter are yet another illustration of how we cannot trust claims from DSFRS’s senior management.

The failure to save the Royal Clarence Hotel 

Unprecedented failure to stop fire spreading

The National Fire Chiefs Council report suggests that it was DSFRS publishing their report on this incident that generated questions about their response. It was not, it was their unprecedented failure to stop the fire spreading, even though they had plenty of time and resources to do so. Serving and retired firefighters, including some who attended the fire, and members of the public were asking questions long before that report was published.

However, the DSFRS report itself is clear evidence that they were trying to shift the blame and hide their failings. There was no mention in the report of the 81 items we now know were identified at the internal debrief. The only recommendations in the report were for building owners and for government. The DSFRS spin machine continued to hide their own failings and present the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel as unavoidable. 

A shabby attempt to blame others for the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel

The spin machine even went on to arrogantly claim that the NFCC report clears them of covering up their failures at this incident. The reality is that the NFCC report shows failures of tactics, deployment, communication, co-ordination, command & control and resourcing. DSFRS’s desperate attempts to keep details of how they responded to this fire from the public is another indication of a disgraceful cover up. Refusing key details in responses to Freedom of Information Act requests, by falsely claiming it would threaten national security, is a serious abuse of the legal exemptions. It is 'crying wolf’ and will undermine cases where there is a genuine risk to national security.

Royal Clarence Hotel could have been saved

The NFCC report says they cannot state "whether or not the RCH could have been saved had different actions or decision making taken place". So it is perfectly possible that it could have been saved with better tactics and decisions. We will never know for certain, but given that the report identified significant failures to properly check for fire spread, there is every possibility that it could have been saved.

Not only was there a failure to provide a continual watching brief in all areas of the Royal Clarence Hotel, there was a failure to even properly check every part of the hotel. Unfortunately, the NFCC report fails to point out that at incidents in such properties you need more than a watching brief, you actively have to search for hidden voids and open them up. Yet, despite knowing about hidden voids at the Royal Clarence Hotel long before the fire, DSFRS failed to carry out this fundamental task. 

The risk of fire travelling through hidden voids was first documented in the 1800s

How to detect and prevent it used to be part of basic firefighter training
Is it still today?

DSFRS state that they won’t put firefighters at risk to save property. Yet the report shows that firefighters were withdrawn from the Royal Clarence Hotel when there was little or no risk in most of the hotel, but sent back in later when the risk had increased significantly. At best this indicates poor dynamic risk assessment and at worst it is a shabby attempt to excuse their failure to deploy the appropriate tactics.

The NFCC report says that there was an absence of a common recognised information picture at this incident but does not establish if this was the result of poor communication, poor command, poor training or all three. Anyone who has studied this fire, and also read Dr Sabrina Cohen-Hatton's book, 'the heat of the moment', will see hints in the NFCC report of the unhelpful behaviours she identified during her research into fire service decision making under pressure. 

Sadly, at this incident, poor decisions are also evident
when there was little or no pressure

BBC 'Inside Out South West'

Warnings ignored

It is disappointing that the NFCC report plays down the importance of the sector 4 commander’s "critical information", simply because the fire broke through the roof in a different area to the area he marked on the floor plan. The sector 4 commander properly reported concerns and a need to take action, but the command team did not act to halt the fire’s progress through the hotel. Where the fire broke through is irrelevant. Knowing that fire was already in the hotel and knowing about the risk of fire spreading through hidden voids, the command team should have already had detecting and dealing with that risk very high on their list of priorities, but they did not. 

The sector 4 commander’s critical information should have been a wake up call,

but it became just another missed opportunity

The report fails to get at the root cause of this fundamental failing. Was it poor information sharing, was it poor training, or simply inept decision making? It certainly seems that the command team had taken their eye off the ball. They had failed to carry out basic checks, wrongly assumed they had control of the situation and were focused on things such as command structures and relief crew rotation. Important stuff, but all secondary to the primary task of stopping the fire spreading.

Why did the most senior officers not take responsibility?

The top 3 management levels

Despite this fire being the largest fire in Exeter since the Second World War, a Brigade Manager did not take charge and the NFCC report surprisingly fails to address this issue. The report also fails to address why an Area Manager did not take charge until more than three hours after the ‘make pumps 15’ message (indicating that 15 fire engines are required). 

Although a Brigade Manager did attend the scene, some two and a half hours after the fire started, he did not take charge and an unnamed Group Manager was left in charge of over 100 firefighters at a complex incident. It seems the Brigade Manager opted to move to the comfort of Gold Command at Police HQ, instead of taking responsibility for firefighting operations at the scene.

Now there are major incidents, such as those affecting a wide area, where the most senior fire & rescue service officer available should attend Gold Command, but a major fire in a city centre is not one of them. The most critical role for this incident was that of Incident Commander, so the most senior officer available should have taken on that role. At the scene he may have identified the need to properly check for hidden fire spread, but he can’t do that sitting at Police HQ.

I also don’t understand the preoccupation in the report with the major incident declaration, aside from it being another illustration of ineffective communication. The declaration of a major incident should have no effect on how the fire is being tackled. At a major fire it only has significant implications for other services and for inter-agency co-ordination away from the scene.

BBC 'Inside Out South West' questions still unanswered

Other deficiencies in the NFCC Report

The report refers to the increased requirement for water overwhelming the water supply at times, but then fails to point out that ensuring adequate water supplies is a fundamental part of managing a fire. This should have been foreseen and planned for. You don't wait for the problem to arise before acting, as that delays effective firefighting and allows the fire to spread.

The NFCC report says that the escalation of the fire at around 10:18 translated in to “a make up for further resources including specialist appliances (ALPs)", but then claims they "arrived shortly afterwards”. According to details finally released under freedom of information legislation, no further appliances were ordered to the incident until 11:04, with the first arriving more than an hour after the escalation and the last two arriving 2 hours and 20 minutes after. The reinforcing ALPs arrived 90 minutes and nearly four hours after the escalation. Hardly “shortly afterwards”, and a significant delay to effective operations. Aerial appliances should have been requested much earlier and deployed much more effectively.

The NFCC report fails to detail the 81 learning points that DSFRS claim to have addressed. If firefighters and the public are to be reassured that DSFRS really has learnt lessons from the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire, the learning points and actions must be published.

The NFCC report has raised as many questions as it has answered

The Fire & Rescue Authority must get to the
bottom of the cover up and the failures

Revised proposals will still put lives in danger

I can understand why some may wish to celebrate the Chief Fire Officer's  revised proposals, but they should not do so too quickly. There is still much to be concerned about. Some people will have to wait longer for help to arrive, when help arrives it will often be less effective, and some cuts may be resurrected soon.

Topsham and Budleigh Salterton to close

It is not clear if the Topsham fire engine being moved permanently to Service HQ will be available at night. If an On Call crew cannot be recruited for the one eventually being moved to Middlemoor, and the one remaining at Service HQ is not crewed at night, then that would be a reduction of one fire engine during the day and two at night. It is possible that, on balance, these moves could improve response times in the Exeter area, but there are a lot of 'ifs'. The haste to close Topsham before an On Call crew is recruited at Middlemoor raises serious questions about the motive. 

The closure of Budleigh Salterton will be a loss of a fire engine in the area and it will increase some response times. Together with the removal of some second and all third fire engines at other stations this will be a total loss of nine front-line fire engines. That will adversely affect the service's resilience and ability to deal with periods of peak demand. Although they state that firefighters from Budleigh Salterton will be able to respond from Exmouth, it is likely that they will struggle to arrive in time to be able to respond. That could demotivate trained and experienced firefighters and result in some of them quitting the service.

Given the amount of inaccurate information and dubious risk modelling  provided during the consultation, 

it is difficult to have confidence in any of DSFRS's claims regarding these two station closures.

The threat remains for other stations

The future of Appledore, Ashburton, Colyton, Kingston, Porlock and Woolacombe is not guaranteed, the stations simply have a reprieve. The report says that they "will be subject to periodic review", which means the axe is still hanging over them. DSFRS had stopped actively recruiting at those stations long before the consultation, presumably to ensure that the stations' availability did not improve. The threat of review will not help recruitment and retention of staff. Of course that may be the intention, so that availability gets worse and can be used as a justification for closure in the future.

The Fire & Rescue Authority must give assurances that

no closures will take place without further public consultation.

The threat for Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton is more imminent, as firefighters are being bullied in to accepting new shift systems. DSFRS is effectively saying, agree to this or we will remove immediate response cover at night for people living in the Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton areas. 

A shabby way to treat dedicated staff and wholly irresponsible 

to use the safety of the public as a bargaining chip in staff negotiations.

This tactic suggests that DSFRS has learnt nothing from the disturbing inspection report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Perhaps not surprising when the Chief Fire Officer thinks bullying and harassment is OK, as long as you call it 'strong management'. 

The Fire & Rescue Authority must respect the public's views and guarantee that 
Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton will continue to have an immediate response crew day and night.

Inadequate and unsafe crewing

Then there is the deception of 'aggregate crewing', which is more accurately described as inadequate and unsafe crewing. I do understand why On Call Firefighters are frustrated that they cannot use their training and experience to help people when not enough of their colleagues are available to provide a minimum crew, but DSFRS should not take advantage of that frustration. 

For those with no fire service experience there is a need to understand the full implications of inadequate crewing. The officer in charge and the driver on a fire engine have specific tasks that are critical to safe and effective operations. That leaves the firefighters who arrive in the rear cab of the fire engine to attack the fire and carry out rescue work.

Having just one or no firefighters on a fire engine to

carry out sharp end rescues and firefighting is unacceptable

These rear cab images illustrate the stark deterioration in safety and effectiveness of DSFRS plans

A crew of 4 is barely safe and adequate

A crew of 3 is unsafe and inadequate

A crew of 2 is dangerous and ineffective

The advantage for the Chief Fire Officer is that the arrival of an inadequately crewed vehicle will allow him to stop the clock and claim he has met the response time target. Yet the reality will be that effective action to deal with the emergency will not start until a second fire engine has arrived from another more distant fire station.

It may also give the public the illusion of help arriving, but the reality will be that effective help is still several minutes away. The public may also become incensed when they realise that the two or three firefighters on the first vehicle are unable to take effective action.

If lives are in danger, firefighters will be forced to choose between having to wait for back up, with a strong likelihood that the victim or victims would not survive, or to ignore safety procedures and take unacceptable risks to try and rescue people. Most firefighters will feel compelled to attempt a rescue, which could cost the lives of both victim and firefighter. Responsible Chief Fire Officers have always refused to put their firefighters in that invidious position.

If the Fire & Rescue Authority decide to put firefighters in danger in this way, they must be honest about response times. A response time should only be recorded as met when at least four firefighters have arrived at an incident.

What are the true figures? 

It is also concerning that, once again, the report is missing important information and includes misleading and inaccurate figures.

A glaring omission, with regard to the financial position, is the amount of money that will be available from the council tax precept. This is integrally linked with these proposals and could mean none of the cuts need to happen. Consulting on a precept increase separately denied the public the opportunity of seeing what effect different precepts would have on the case for cuts.

No doubt the excuse will be that the precept consultation only closed two weeks ago and that the budget meeting is not until next month. However, that is no excuse for failing to show the implications of differing precept amounts on the proposals in this report.

Not only does the blatant attempt to deceive the public about the effect of the cuts continues in this report, but they have again manipulated the figures. This table in the report is not, as claimed, comparing 'As is' with options 6 & 7 "based on all fire appliances being available". It is dishonestly comparing poor availability of appliances now, with an idealised future where all appliances are available. That is deception, plain and simple.

In the original consultation document (see below) we were told that, based on all appliances being available, 'as is' (theoretical full availability in the consultation document) was an average of 7.61 fire deaths per year, but now they claim it is 7.99. Similarly, we were originally told that RTC deaths, with all fire appliances available, averaged 33.14 per year, but now they claim it is 33.72. DSFRS seem determined to manipulate the figures to make the cuts appear less damaging than they really are. The figures for option 7 are pure fantasy, as you cannot properly model the effect of roving fire engines.

Extract from the original consultation report

Removal of second and third fire engines will mean delayed responses

These fire engines may not be used as frequently as others, but they play an important part in ensuring proper fire cover. Without them, other fire engines from further away will need to be sent with inevitable delay that could cost lives.

Emergencies are random events and every year there will be several occasions when a call is received in a station's area whilst crews are already attending another incident. The fire stations with three fire engines are busier, so that will happen much more frequently. Without that third fire engine people will have to wait longer for help to arrive from another station. That will also have a knock on effect, as that creates a further gap in that area's protection.

The stations losing second fire engines may not be as busy, but simultaneous emergencies still occur with similar delays. Lynton's isolated location makes this a particular problem. Despite post-war austerity, and many less calls than today, Devon County Council recognised the risk in 1948 and decided that the station should have two fire engines. The 1952 flood tragedy illustrated how important that was, as the two crews were able to split up and save lives in different locations when crews from other stations could not reach the area. 

Chief Fire Officers and Councillors have continued to recognise the importance of keeping two fire engines at Lynton for over 50 years. It has often proved its worth. Yet now, that common sense and professional competence is tossed aside to save a little bit of money. 

It makes no sense to say that Frome will have their second fire engine available 24 hours a day 'due to its distance from other stations', but then permanently remove Lynton's second fire engine when it is even more remote. There are two fire stations with 3 fire engines within 7 miles of Frome. The nearest two fire engines to Lynton are each over 12 miles away and they have to travel on slower roads. If they are unavailable, then the next nearest help is over 18 miles away.

Roving fire engines ineffective and inefficient

To keep six roving fire engines on minimum crew will need 24 firefighters, plus others to cover leave, sickness and training. The chances of them being in the right location for the next emergency is slim, especially if prevention work dictates where they will be. As there is no indication that extra firefighters are to be recruited, there will clearly be a reduction in crewing elsewhere. That has safety implications and will delay responses elsewhere, but it is not explained in the report.

It is also an inefficient way to use 24+ firefighters. The On Call fire engines are rarely unavailable because none of the firefighters are available, it is often that they don't have someone available who is qualified to drive the fire engine or to take charge of an incident. Intelligent deployment of those 24 firefighters could see up to 24 extra fire engines available during the day, not just six. Similarly, they could also be carrying out four times more prevention work, whilst remaining available for any emergencies.

Variable fire appliance availability flawed

The claim that this will be based on risk is untrue. They are simply looking at call frequency in the past and gambling on likelihood in the future. 

The claims about fires being less serious during the day are half truths. National statistics for 2018/19 show that 8.6% of fire deaths in the home occurred between nine and eleven in the evening, yet 9.7% occurred between 9 and 11 in the morning. Similarly, fatalities in fire service attended road crashes between 3 and 5 in the morning amount to 4%, whilst between 3 and 5 in the afternoon they amount to 12.3%.

The risk of someone being trapped in a fire or crash is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year and exists in every part of Devon & Somerset. DSFRS does not have a crystal ball, they cannot predict when or where someone will need to be rescued or a fire, large or small, needs to be dealt with.

All resources must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.

Unfair Consultation Report

The report is rightly critical of the way the proposals were presented, but Opinion Research Services is wrong to claim that 95% opposition to the proposals is not a balanced picture of general public opinion. The simple truth is that people in Devon and Somerset are not easily manipulated. They saw through the spin and misinformation and resoundingly rejected the proposals.

It is a nonsense to suggest that forums or focus groups would provide a more balanced picture of public opinion. They are particularly unbalanced, as the only information provided to the attendees is in support of the proposed changes. The chances of someone being there with the necessary details and data to challenge unsubstantiated claims and inaccurate data is remote.

The way the report tries to dismiss petitions by saying they "can exaggerate general public sentiment if organised by motivated opponents" is disturbing. That may be their opinion, but it is disrespectful to both those who organised and those who signed the petition. Rather like telling people they were too stupid to know what they were voting for! 

Anyone who has ever organised a petition, or collected signatures for one, knows that it is not an easy task and that people don't sign if they are not convinced it represents their views. An indication of how strong a message these petitions are sending to the Fire & Rescue Authority is that a higher percentage of Devon & Somerset's population signed them than the percentage of the nation's population required to have a petition debated in Parliament. The 3,818 written responses, including 94 from councils and other organisations, was exceptionally high and reflects widespread opposition to the proposed cuts.

Now I understand that Opinion Research Services want to keep their fire & rescue service customers happy. Reports that show as much public support as opposition to proposals will do that, and those with majority support will suit customers even better. So a report in which they have to admit 95% of the responses from the public oppose the proposed cuts is not what their customer, Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service, would have wanted to see. 

I don't believe their recommendations for future consultations will achieve true balance. They seem more intended to limit discussion by giving the public a one sided picture that will make them more likely to support future proposals.

It was 'Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service' that tried to fool the public with false claims and misleading information. I should add that I don't believe their communications team should take the blame, as they can only work with the information and data provided by senior management.

Many good and honest people across Devon & Somerset campaigned to ensure the public realised
 this was not about improvement, but about poorly disguised and dangerous cuts. 

They should all be proud of their efforts, they have helped safeguard lives and property.

Where are the vital papers for the Fire & Rescue Authority meeting?

One week tomorrow the Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Authority meets to consider cuts to the service that will have serious implications for the safety of the public and firefighters. Despite this, the all important final proposals are still not publicly available. Even the results of the public consultation are still under wraps, although we know there is widespread opposition to the original proposals.

Noises have been made that views have been listened to by DSFRS and that Government is increasing funding for the service next year, but at the moment the threat of cuts remains. It is unacceptable that the public are being denied sufficient time to consider the final proposals and to make their views known to Fire & Rescue Authority Members. It is also questionable if FRA Members will have adequate time to properly consider the proposals before the meeting.

On the subject of the report on the public consultation there are some key points that FRA Members need to consider. The report will not, and cannot, say if the proposals are good or bad, it will simply collate views voiced by the public. As Opinion Research Services is being paid by DSFRS they cannot be considered completely impartial. ORS relies on fire services being happy with their reports to get further business, so it is not in their interest to publish a report the service is unhappy with.

I have yet to read one of their reports that is critical of the way the consultation was carried out. There have been clear breaches of good practice in the way DSFRS carried out the consultation, so it will be interesting to see if the report addresses those breaches or simply fails to mention them. The reports also try to steer FRAs away from giving due consideration to petitions. It may be the opinion of ORS that they are of less importance, but in my experience they accurately reflect the public's view. It is worth remembering that the percentage of the population in Devon & Somerset who have signed the petitions is much greater than the percentage required to have a petition debated in Parliament.

The report of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on the running of DSFRS, and the National Fire Chiefs Council's report on DSFRS's failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter raise serious questions about senior management decision making. 

Whatever is now proposed by the Chief Fire Officer, FRA Members now have even more reason to challenge the proposals and question the claims used to justify them.

It is time to stop listening to spin and to start listening to public concern.