Report confirms cover up but DSFRS still in denial

Cuts reduced but some will wait longer for help to arrive

I was going to comment on the National Fire Chiefs Council investigation of the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter earlier, but decided not to distract from the fight to stop the damaging cuts proposed by the Chief Fire Officer. The Fire & Rescue Authority decision was disappointing, as it will still result in some people having to wait longer for help to arrive. That the cuts were not worse had much to do with the steadfast efforts of local campaigners who exposed the misinformation and inaccuracies from Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service.

BBC News

Campaigners must continue to monitor developments to make sure cuts are not sneaked back in, and the Authority must ensure that the Chief Fire Officer honours his improvement assurances. Many of them seemed little more than wishful thinking, so it will be interesting to see if claims about more prevention cutting the number of incidents and deaths actually materialise. 

It will also be interesting to see if availability and response times actually improve, as the latest national data shows they are progressively getting worse. The Chief Fire Officer must not be allowed to falsely claim improvement by using figures for inadequately crewed stations and appliances. 

For statistical purposes, a fire station with less than

four firefighters available must not be counted as available

First appliance response times must not be shown as met

until at least four firefighters have arrived at an incident

Unfortunately, we can't rely on the Fire & Rescue Authority to hold the Chief Fire Officer to account, so everyone needs to stay alert. The failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter are yet another illustration of how we cannot trust claims from DSFRS’s senior management.

The failure to save the Royal Clarence Hotel 

Unprecedented failure to stop fire spreading

The National Fire Chiefs Council report suggests that it was DSFRS publishing their report on this incident that generated questions about their response. It was not, it was their unprecedented failure to stop the fire spreading, even though they had plenty of time and resources to do so. Serving and retired firefighters, including some who attended the fire, and members of the public were asking questions long before that report was published.

However, the DSFRS report itself is clear evidence that they were trying to shift the blame and hide their failings. There was no mention in the report of the 81 items we now know were identified at the internal debrief. The only recommendations in the report were for building owners and for government. The DSFRS spin machine continued to hide their own failings and present the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel as unavoidable. 

A shabby attempt to blame others for the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel

The spin machine even went on to arrogantly claim that the NFCC report clears them of covering up their failures at this incident. The reality is that the NFCC report shows failures of tactics, deployment, communication, co-ordination, command & control and resourcing. DSFRS’s desperate attempts to keep details of how they responded to this fire from the public is another indication of a disgraceful cover up. Refusing key details in responses to Freedom of Information Act requests, by falsely claiming it would threaten national security, is a serious abuse of the legal exemptions. It is 'crying wolf’ and will undermine cases where there is a genuine risk to national security.

Royal Clarence Hotel could have been saved

The NFCC report says they cannot state "whether or not the RCH could have been saved had different actions or decision making taken place". So it is perfectly possible that it could have been saved with better tactics and decisions. We will never know for certain, but given that the report identified significant failures to properly check for fire spread, there is every possibility that it could have been saved.

Not only was there a failure to provide a continual watching brief in all areas of the Royal Clarence Hotel, there was a failure to even properly check every part of the hotel. Unfortunately, the NFCC report fails to point out that at incidents in such properties you need more than a watching brief, you actively have to search for hidden voids and open them up. Yet, despite knowing about hidden voids at the Royal Clarence Hotel long before the fire, DSFRS failed to carry out this fundamental task. 

The risk of fire travelling through hidden voids was first documented in the 1800s

How to detect and prevent it used to be part of basic firefighter training
Is it still today?

DSFRS state that they won’t put firefighters at risk to save property. Yet the report shows that firefighters were withdrawn from the Royal Clarence Hotel when there was little or no risk in most of the hotel, but sent back in later when the risk had increased significantly. At best this indicates poor dynamic risk assessment and at worst it is a shabby attempt to excuse their failure to deploy the appropriate tactics.

The NFCC report says that there was an absence of a common recognised information picture at this incident but does not establish if this was the result of poor communication, poor command, poor training or all three. Anyone who has studied this fire, and also read Dr Sabrina Cohen-Hatton's book, 'the heat of the moment', will see hints in the NFCC report of the unhelpful behaviours she identified during her research into fire service decision making under pressure. 

Sadly, at this incident, poor decisions are also evident
when there was little or no pressure

BBC 'Inside Out South West'

Warnings ignored

It is disappointing that the NFCC report plays down the importance of the sector 4 commander’s "critical information", simply because the fire broke through the roof in a different area to the area he marked on the floor plan. The sector 4 commander properly reported concerns and a need to take action, but the command team did not act to halt the fire’s progress through the hotel. Where the fire broke through is irrelevant. Knowing that fire was already in the hotel and knowing about the risk of fire spreading through hidden voids, the command team should have already had detecting and dealing with that risk very high on their list of priorities, but they did not. 

The sector 4 commander’s critical information should have been a wake up call,

but it became just another missed opportunity

The report fails to get at the root cause of this fundamental failing. Was it poor information sharing, was it poor training, or simply inept decision making? It certainly seems that the command team had taken their eye off the ball. They had failed to carry out basic checks, wrongly assumed they had control of the situation and were focused on things such as command structures and relief crew rotation. Important stuff, but all secondary to the primary task of stopping the fire spreading.

Why did the most senior officers not take responsibility?

The top 3 management levels

Despite this fire being the largest fire in Exeter since the Second World War, a Brigade Manager did not take charge and the NFCC report surprisingly fails to address this issue. The report also fails to address why an Area Manager did not take charge until more than three hours after the ‘make pumps 15’ message (indicating that 15 fire engines are required). 

Although a Brigade Manager did attend the scene, some two and a half hours after the fire started, he did not take charge and an unnamed Group Manager was left in charge of over 100 firefighters at a complex incident. It seems the Brigade Manager opted to move to the comfort of Gold Command at Police HQ, instead of taking responsibility for firefighting operations at the scene.

Now there are major incidents, such as those affecting a wide area, where the most senior fire & rescue service officer available should attend Gold Command, but a major fire in a city centre is not one of them. The most critical role for this incident was that of Incident Commander, so the most senior officer available should have taken on that role. At the scene he may have identified the need to properly check for hidden fire spread, but he can’t do that sitting at Police HQ.

I also don’t understand the preoccupation in the report with the major incident declaration, aside from it being another illustration of ineffective communication. The declaration of a major incident should have no effect on how the fire is being tackled. At a major fire it only has significant implications for other services and for inter-agency co-ordination away from the scene.

BBC 'Inside Out South West' questions still unanswered

Other deficiencies in the NFCC Report

The report refers to the increased requirement for water overwhelming the water supply at times, but then fails to point out that ensuring adequate water supplies is a fundamental part of managing a fire. This should have been foreseen and planned for. You don't wait for the problem to arise before acting, as that delays effective firefighting and allows the fire to spread.

The NFCC report says that the escalation of the fire at around 10:18 translated in to “a make up for further resources including specialist appliances (ALPs)", but then claims they "arrived shortly afterwards”. According to details finally released under freedom of information legislation, no further appliances were ordered to the incident until 11:04, with the first arriving more than an hour after the escalation and the last two arriving 2 hours and 20 minutes after. The reinforcing ALPs arrived 90 minutes and nearly four hours after the escalation. Hardly “shortly afterwards”, and a significant delay to effective operations. Aerial appliances should have been requested much earlier and deployed much more effectively.

The NFCC report fails to detail the 81 learning points that DSFRS claim to have addressed. If firefighters and the public are to be reassured that DSFRS really has learnt lessons from the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire, the learning points and actions must be published.

The NFCC report has raised as many questions as it has answered

The Fire & Rescue Authority must get to the
bottom of the cover up and the failures

Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service blunders on

It seems that Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s leadership is incapable of learning from their mistakes, or of complying with the law. They are clearly desperate to cover up their failings and poor decision making by any means possible.

This week a ruling confirmed that they failed to comply with the Freedom of Information Act, and last week there was another move in the continuing cover up regarding the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel in Exeter.

No risk assessments for Really Inadequate Vehicle policy

The Information Commissioner has now ruled that Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service breached sections 10 and 17 of the Freedom of Information Act, in relation to a request for information about their decision to provide some communities with less capable fire engines.

The Commissioner has ordered D&SF&RS to provide missing and redacted information within 35 days and, if they fail to do so, the matter could be referred to the High Court to be dealt with as a contempt of court.

Included in the information they have been trying to keep secret are the risk assessments that should have been completed before they replaced well equipped fire engines with vehicles that are far less effective.

D&SF&RS regularly claim that resources are being matched to risk, but they refuse to provide copies of their risk assessments. In particular, how they assessed the risk of replacing well equipped fire engines with vehicles that are far less effective.

So, either they have not carried out proper risk assessments, 

or there are serious risks they don’t want the public or firefighters to know about.

Royal Clarence Hotel

The Information Commissioner has yet to rule on D&SF&RS’s failure to provide information that would allow scrutiny of their actions at the Cathedral Yard fire.  The information was requested last September. Now, presumably to try and placate the Commissioner, they have belatedly released a version of the Fire Control Incident Log. Unfortunately, as so much of the detail useful for scrutiny has been redacted, it tells us very little.

Information they want to keep secret includes: 

• Details of which fire engines were sent, when they were sent, how long they took to arrive, when they left the incident, and how many firefighters were on them.
• Significant detail in messages between the control room and the incident that give details of the extent of the fire and what action the crews were taking.
• Some assistance messages redacted completely and detail missing in others.
• The names of officers taking decisions and in overall command of the incident at different times.

The public and firefighters have legitimate concerns

BBC Inside Out South West

To justify keeping this information secret they are misusing an exemption in the legislation that is intended to protect information related to law enforcement. It is quite ludicrous to claim that, for example, information on what time the fire engine from Dawlish was sent to the incident “would, or would be likely to, prejudice” .. “the exercise by any public authority of its functions for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of an accident.” 

It would be laughable, if this were not such a serious matter.

Clearly aware how weak their justification is, they have produced an additional document in which they try to suggest that this information would help “those with malicious intent” and is necessary to “protect the Service and wider society from potential crime”. Once again utterly ludicrous. Hiding this information is not in the public interest, but the Chief Fire Officer must think it is in his interest.

Having worked with security sensitive information and discussed policies with the police, security services and the Cabinet Office, I fully understand the need to be cautious about information that might be useful to terrorists. 

However, information on how the service managed, or mismanaged, 

a fire nearly three years ago is of no use to terrorists whatsoever.

Mr Nobody did it

Those who are parents will be familiar with children’s denials when they have done something wrong. It seems D&SF&RS are following that example by removing names from documents, so that we have no idea who was responsible for anything.

They did eventually disclose the name of the most senior person responsible for two of the vehicle related documents, but not for all of them. So, for no legitimate reason, the names of some project managers and of those who reviewed or approved the reports are kept secret.

Astonishingly they claim this was because they “believed that there may be inappropriate contact and naming of these individuals in the media, due to the way in which its responses had been used in the past. Disclosure of the information about these third parties could clearly have very detrimental consequences.”

They don’t explain what “detrimental consequences” or “inappropriate contact” they are referring to, or provide any evidence to support their claim about past use of their responses, or even why they describe their own employees as "third parties". Critics of the changes have not contacted any individual employee - appropriately, or inappropriately. 

It all points to the real reason being that they don’t like 

anyone asking awkward questions or criticising their decisions

D&SF&RS need to understand that if they require their managers to make inaccurate and misleading claims in interviews, press releases and on social media, in an effort to justify dangerous cuts to the service, those claims have to be challenged. Do they really expect us to believe that fire service managers, who have risked life and limb, are going to dissolve in to tears when someone challenges what they said, or asks difficult questions?

D&SF&RS put them in that position, not those campaigning to stop dangerous changes. 

In the case of the Royal Clarence Hotel log, all the names have been removed from the released Fire Control log. So, apparently, we are not to be told who was in overall charge of the incident at any stage. 

You have to wonder, if they did such a good job, why they don’t want their names associated with the incident.

The exemptions in the legislation were never intended to allow people, who are paid by taxpayers to protect the public, to hide their activities under a cloak of anonymity. D&SF&RS claims to be open, honest and accountable, yet these actions demonstrate it is not. Compounding the secrecy and cover up by trying to deceive the Information Commissioner with spurious claims is equally irresponsible.

Until the fire authority ensures this information is put fully in the public domain,

the service will sadly remain the Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service.

An Honest Fire & Rescue Service or a

The cover up continues

Those concerned with the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter on 28 October 2016, which resulted in the loss of the historic Royal Clarence Hotel, have been trying to get answers. A Freedom of Information request for copies of incident logs and other recorded information was submitted last September by respected fire safety consultant Alan Cox. Instead of providing copies of the documents within the required 20 working days, the request was met with delays and excuses.

One disturbing excuse in November was, “the main subject experts are no longer employees.” You don’t need former employees to copy reports or to redact exempt material from documents and records. They went on to say, “one of them is coming in next week to assist”. Assist with what, removing details from the reports, adding detail that should have been recorded at the time, or altering the reports to cover up failures? Such actions would not only be inappropriate, they would be illegal.

Finally, at the beginning of this month, one document has now been provided. Not, however, scans of the original Fire Ground Event & Decision Log that was completed during the incident, but a typed transcript. When questioned, the sender is only able to say that she "understands" it to be "a direct copy”. Following the earlier reference to a former employee coming in to assist, concerns are heightened that, instead of an exact copy, this is just a sanitised version.

Despite Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s claim to be open, responsible and accountable, they have redacted all the names in the log. It is not acceptable to shield publicly employed managers from public scrutiny by misusing exemptions that are designed to protect people from unreasonable intrusion in to their private lives. That was never the intention of the Data Protection Act, or the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act.  

We are only talking about the names of these publicly employed officials, not their age, home address, or other genuinely personal data. These names would be made public if there was a court case, inquest or public inquiry, so why not now? Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service happily publish the names of personnel in press releases and on their website for positive stories, so why are they hiding these names? There is no justification, and this secrecy only reinforces concerns that, instead of learning from their failings, they want to cover them up.

Fire Ground Event & Decision Log

So, what does the only document provided so far tell us? It tells us that plans for the Royal Clarence Hotel were being sent to the incident at 08:24, which is more than 3 hours after the first fire engine arrived. That raises several questions, including why were plans for this historic building, with a significant life risk, not available on fire engines and why had they not been requested much earlier? It also suggests that someone still had concerns about the fire affecting the hotel, even though reports indicate that, at the same time, the hotel was not being properly checked for fire spread and that resources were being released from the incident.

Even more concerning, at 09:45, the record of the inter-agency meeting says that the fire was “now contained” and that the risk assessment had “taken into account fire spread at roof level”. Crucially, there was no mention of fire spreading to the Royal Clarence Hotel in the list of risks still being considered. 

Astonishingly, at 09:40, it records just 2 breathing apparatus sets, one aerial appliance and one firefighting jet in use. Photos then show that, shortly after, the aerial appliance was no longer in action. It is also unclear, if this is an exact copy of the original, how the 09:40 log entry was recorded after the 09:45 entry.

Despite the apparent confidence that the fire was contained and would not spread, less than 20 minutes later, large volumes of smoke are rising from the roof of the Royal Clarence Hotel. It is also more than five hours after firefighters were first called to the incident. Resources that had been released are called back and additional resources have to be requested. Firefighters universally regard having to ask for additional resources, after they have been sent away, as a cardinal sin indicating poor decision making and assessment. Exactly what resources had been released from the incident too early is not shown in this log, which is why it is important for the control room log to be produced. 

International Fire Protection magazine

The missing documents

It is quite clear that the control room log is one of the documents that they don’t want to be made public. Eight months after these documents were requested, they are now making the excuse that the Monitoring Officer needs to consider if they are exempt under section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act. This is undoubtedly a last-ditch attempt to keep this information from public scrutiny, as that section is primarily intended to protect information about sensitive Government negotiations. For other public bodies it is only about disclosure that might prejudice “the effective conduct of public affairs.”

Key to legitimate use of this exemption is the public interest test. It is painfully obvious that understanding why there was such a catastrophic failure at this incident, despite the magnificent work of so many firefighters, is very much in the public interest. Not least to ensure such failures do not occur in the future. Section 36 is not there to frustrate scrutiny, or to serve the personal interest of individuals.

If section 36 is used to withhold information, then it will effectively be an admission that 

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service has something to hide

It is rather like a drink driver refusing to be tested. They know they are over the limit, the police know they are over the limit, the courts know they are over the limit, but they just want to hide exactly how much over the limit they are.

The fake review of the Cathedral Yard fire

In January, Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service announced a review of the Cathedral Yard fire by the National Fire Chiefs Council, which they claimed would provide “an independent view from people who understand operational tactics”. However, the review by West Midlands Fire & Rescue Service has been told by Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service to only review the methods used to compile the original report. A much criticised report that had recommendations for others, but none for Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service.

By mentioning operational tactics, it appears they hoped to give the impression that it was a full review of the incident. However, as Assistant Chief Fire Officer Peter Bond confirmed in correspondence with the Fire Brigades Union, “It is not a review of the actual incident or any operational tactics.” He also says that the review was requested "following allegations that were made in the media", but the limitations they have imposed prevent any review of tactics and actions that are at the heart of those allegations.

Mr Bond also refused to allow the FBU to be involved with the process, other than to accompany any FBU member who wanted support when interviewed. Another indication that they did not want a full and open investigation. Surprising and worrying when Mr Bond is supposed to be the Director of Service Improvement.

The FBU raised several concerns after the fire, but none of these were included in the whitewash report. Other professionals and the victims of the fire share those concerns. I understand that the review team carried out interviews with selected personnel at the end of March, but a review report has yet to appear. It will be interesting to see if West Midlands Chief Fire Officer Phil Loach decides to support a fellow Chief Fire Officer's whitewash, or if he will make it clear that he is unable to properly address the many genuine concerns about the handling of this fire.

This is not about finding people to punish for any failings, it is about understanding what went wrong, why it went wrong, and taking action to stop similar failures in the future. 

If the Fire & Rescue Authority genuinely cares about public safety it will make the requested documents public

and ensure that a full and truly independent investigation is carried out.

Claiming these values is meaningless
when your actions demonstrate the opposite

Your firefighters and the public deserve better

Third class service for some residents in Devon & Somerset

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Authority is gradually reducing the protection they provide to people in many areas. Worst affected will be those living in rural areas, villages and smaller towns. Those in major towns and cities will also be affected at busy times, when less well equipped vehicles and less well trained firefighters have to be brought in to assist, or to provide cover.

Anyone who sleeps in a property above the first floor will be particularly at risk, if a fire breaks out, as new vehicles only carry a short ladder. Dartmouth, Tiverton, Princetown, and Porlock have been disclosed as the first areas to be affected.

The Authority has embarked on a campaign to persuade people that these cuts are improvements, so this Blog is to help draw attention to the very real dangers. I was born and raised in Devon and my Mother and several other relatives and friends still live in the service's area, which is why I am especially concerned.

It is fundamentally wrong that people in some areas of Devon & Somerset should have less effective protection, just because emergencies occur less frequently in their particular area. The life of someone living on or near Exmoor or Dartmoor is just as valuable as the life of someone living in Exeter, Plymouth or Taunton. People can be trapped in a fire or a road crash anywhere in Devon & Somerset, so it is unacceptable that the first firefighters sent to help some of them will be less well equipped and less well trained.

Fully equipped fire engines are being replaced with less effective vehicles

The Authority is cutting the existing 121 Medium Rescue Pumps (MRP), which are very well equipped, to just 37 Medium Rescue Pumps. The others are being replaced with 39 Light Rescue Pumps (LRP), which carry less water and equipment, and 45 Rapid Intervention Vehicles (RIV), which carry even less water, equipment and crew. In comparison to Medium Rescue Pumps, the Light Rescue Pumps offer a second class service. The Rapid Intervention Vehicles will only offer a third class service.

Rapid Intervention Vehicles carry:

56% less water, 50% less hose reel, 50% less 70mm diameter hose, 30% less 45mm diameter hose, 25% less breathing apparatus sets, and 25% less suction hose.

No portable pump, which can be vital for firefighting in rural areas where hydrants are few and far between and for pumping out flooded properties.

No foam, which is essential for flammable liquid fires.

No positive pressure fan, which is invaluable for clearing smoke to aid rescue and firefighting.

Those are just some of the essential pieces of equipment that are not carried. They will say that some are not used often, but that does not help firefighters, or the public, when an incident occurs where they are needed.

Of greatest concern, they do not carry a rescue ladder 

Previously, every fire station, except Lundy, had a ladder that would reach the third or fourth floor. These plans will see many fire stations only having a ladder that will reach the first floor. Anyone trapped on a higher floor would have to wait for help to arrive from a fire station much further away, and inevitably some will not survive the wait.

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Authority are also considering sending the Rapid Intervention Vehicles to emergencies with as few as two firefighters, instead of at least four on a proper fire engine. That may help the Authority tick the box for meeting response times, but it will not help those in peril. 

Safe and effective rescue needs not less than four firefighters. 

This idea is based on their unsubstantiated claim that “Over 70% of incidents we attend could be fully dealt with by a crew of two.” When the claim was challenged with a Freedom of Information request, they admitted that they had no documentation to support the claim. In their attempts to explain, they first said that they assessed incidents that could be dealt with by “2 or 3 people”, but then said, "It has been calculated that rapid intervention with less than four personnel may have dealt with 63% of all incidents". 

So there is no documented research or analysis, and no explanation of how “less than four may have dealt with 63% of all incidents”, magically becomes “70% could be fully dealt with by a crew of two.”

They also admitted that over 50% of the incidents they had assumed could be dealt with by less than four firefighters were false alarms. Of course they don't know it is a false alarm until they get there, so this crackpot theory would mean they would need a crystal ball to keep firefighters and the public safe.

They claim that smaller vehicles are quicker, but have failed to provide evidence. This was a particular claim for the Light Rescue Pumps, which have been in service since 2013. Home Office figures for Devon & Somerset show that average response times to primary fires (the most serious ones) have actually increased. 

Even if they could arrive a bit quicker, if they don’t have long enough ladders, the right equipment, enough water and enough firefighters, then the public & firefighters are put at much greater risk.

They claim that they are matching resources to risk, but ignore the fact that the risk to people trapped by fire, or in a wrecked car, is exactly the same no matter where they are in the area. They have been asked via a Freedom of Information request to produce their analysis and risk assessments. No station area risk assessments have been provided, and they have clearly not carried out an assessment of how less well equipped vehicles, with less well trained firefighters, will impact on public and firefighter safety.

Less well trained firefighters

They claim that with less equipment on the Rapid Intervention Vehicles, the training requirement will be reduced. Yet this will result in many firefighters being unable to help colleagues in other areas, as they won’t have been trained to use all the equipment on the remaining 37 Medium Rescue Pumps. It will be a nightmare for those in charge at incidents, when certain equipment needs to be used, if the only firefighters not yet committed have not been trained to use that equipment. They will have no choice but to request another crew, which may have a very long distance to travel.

At busy times, it also means that less well trained firefighters, on less capable vehicles, will be sent to serious incidents in what D&SF&RS class as higher risk areas. For example, crews at Ivybridge and Yelverton are never going to attend a fire on a nuclear submarine in their station areas. However, they could be first to attend such an incident, if they are standing by at Plymouth fire stations, whilst those crews are attending other incidents. 

Not training or equipping them for all potential incidents is simply irresponsible, and may well be unlawful. 

Just remember the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter, on the 28th October 2016. 95 fire engines from urban and rural fire stations across Devon & Somerset attended that fire, as initial response, or as relief crews. Several others were moved from rural areas to fill the gaps at the main fire stations in urban areas. They were all well trained and none were on poorly equipped Rapid Intervention Vehicles. The Fire Authority's plans will make dealing with such incidents in the future much less effective and much more dangerous for firefighters and the public.

Before starting this Blog I discussed the situation with a number of firefighters in the area, both serving and retired, and they share these concerns. Unfortunately, those still serving fear the consequences if they publicly criticise the changes. I hope this Blog will help give them a voice.