Report confirms cover up but DSFRS still in denial

Cuts reduced but some will wait longer for help to arrive

I was going to comment on the National Fire Chiefs Council investigation of the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter earlier, but decided not to distract from the fight to stop the damaging cuts proposed by the Chief Fire Officer. The Fire & Rescue Authority decision was disappointing, as it will still result in some people having to wait longer for help to arrive. That the cuts were not worse had much to do with the steadfast efforts of local campaigners who exposed the misinformation and inaccuracies from Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service.

BBC News

Campaigners must continue to monitor developments to make sure cuts are not sneaked back in, and the Authority must ensure that the Chief Fire Officer honours his improvement assurances. Many of them seemed little more than wishful thinking, so it will be interesting to see if claims about more prevention cutting the number of incidents and deaths actually materialise. 

It will also be interesting to see if availability and response times actually improve, as the latest national data shows they are progressively getting worse. The Chief Fire Officer must not be allowed to falsely claim improvement by using figures for inadequately crewed stations and appliances. 

For statistical purposes, a fire station with less than

four firefighters available must not be counted as available

First appliance response times must not be shown as met

until at least four firefighters have arrived at an incident

Unfortunately, we can't rely on the Fire & Rescue Authority to hold the Chief Fire Officer to account, so everyone needs to stay alert. The failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter are yet another illustration of how we cannot trust claims from DSFRS’s senior management.

The failure to save the Royal Clarence Hotel 

Unprecedented failure to stop fire spreading

The National Fire Chiefs Council report suggests that it was DSFRS publishing their report on this incident that generated questions about their response. It was not, it was their unprecedented failure to stop the fire spreading, even though they had plenty of time and resources to do so. Serving and retired firefighters, including some who attended the fire, and members of the public were asking questions long before that report was published.

However, the DSFRS report itself is clear evidence that they were trying to shift the blame and hide their failings. There was no mention in the report of the 81 items we now know were identified at the internal debrief. The only recommendations in the report were for building owners and for government. The DSFRS spin machine continued to hide their own failings and present the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel as unavoidable. 

A shabby attempt to blame others for the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel

The spin machine even went on to arrogantly claim that the NFCC report clears them of covering up their failures at this incident. The reality is that the NFCC report shows failures of tactics, deployment, communication, co-ordination, command & control and resourcing. DSFRS’s desperate attempts to keep details of how they responded to this fire from the public is another indication of a disgraceful cover up. Refusing key details in responses to Freedom of Information Act requests, by falsely claiming it would threaten national security, is a serious abuse of the legal exemptions. It is 'crying wolf’ and will undermine cases where there is a genuine risk to national security.

Royal Clarence Hotel could have been saved

The NFCC report says they cannot state "whether or not the RCH could have been saved had different actions or decision making taken place". So it is perfectly possible that it could have been saved with better tactics and decisions. We will never know for certain, but given that the report identified significant failures to properly check for fire spread, there is every possibility that it could have been saved.

Not only was there a failure to provide a continual watching brief in all areas of the Royal Clarence Hotel, there was a failure to even properly check every part of the hotel. Unfortunately, the NFCC report fails to point out that at incidents in such properties you need more than a watching brief, you actively have to search for hidden voids and open them up. Yet, despite knowing about hidden voids at the Royal Clarence Hotel long before the fire, DSFRS failed to carry out this fundamental task. 

The risk of fire travelling through hidden voids was first documented in the 1800s

How to detect and prevent it used to be part of basic firefighter training
Is it still today?

DSFRS state that they won’t put firefighters at risk to save property. Yet the report shows that firefighters were withdrawn from the Royal Clarence Hotel when there was little or no risk in most of the hotel, but sent back in later when the risk had increased significantly. At best this indicates poor dynamic risk assessment and at worst it is a shabby attempt to excuse their failure to deploy the appropriate tactics.

The NFCC report says that there was an absence of a common recognised information picture at this incident but does not establish if this was the result of poor communication, poor command, poor training or all three. Anyone who has studied this fire, and also read Dr Sabrina Cohen-Hatton's book, 'the heat of the moment', will see hints in the NFCC report of the unhelpful behaviours she identified during her research into fire service decision making under pressure. 

Sadly, at this incident, poor decisions are also evident
when there was little or no pressure

BBC 'Inside Out South West'

Warnings ignored

It is disappointing that the NFCC report plays down the importance of the sector 4 commander’s "critical information", simply because the fire broke through the roof in a different area to the area he marked on the floor plan. The sector 4 commander properly reported concerns and a need to take action, but the command team did not act to halt the fire’s progress through the hotel. Where the fire broke through is irrelevant. Knowing that fire was already in the hotel and knowing about the risk of fire spreading through hidden voids, the command team should have already had detecting and dealing with that risk very high on their list of priorities, but they did not. 

The sector 4 commander’s critical information should have been a wake up call,

but it became just another missed opportunity

The report fails to get at the root cause of this fundamental failing. Was it poor information sharing, was it poor training, or simply inept decision making? It certainly seems that the command team had taken their eye off the ball. They had failed to carry out basic checks, wrongly assumed they had control of the situation and were focused on things such as command structures and relief crew rotation. Important stuff, but all secondary to the primary task of stopping the fire spreading.

Why did the most senior officers not take responsibility?

The top 3 management levels

Despite this fire being the largest fire in Exeter since the Second World War, a Brigade Manager did not take charge and the NFCC report surprisingly fails to address this issue. The report also fails to address why an Area Manager did not take charge until more than three hours after the ‘make pumps 15’ message (indicating that 15 fire engines are required). 

Although a Brigade Manager did attend the scene, some two and a half hours after the fire started, he did not take charge and an unnamed Group Manager was left in charge of over 100 firefighters at a complex incident. It seems the Brigade Manager opted to move to the comfort of Gold Command at Police HQ, instead of taking responsibility for firefighting operations at the scene.

Now there are major incidents, such as those affecting a wide area, where the most senior fire & rescue service officer available should attend Gold Command, but a major fire in a city centre is not one of them. The most critical role for this incident was that of Incident Commander, so the most senior officer available should have taken on that role. At the scene he may have identified the need to properly check for hidden fire spread, but he can’t do that sitting at Police HQ.

I also don’t understand the preoccupation in the report with the major incident declaration, aside from it being another illustration of ineffective communication. The declaration of a major incident should have no effect on how the fire is being tackled. At a major fire it only has significant implications for other services and for inter-agency co-ordination away from the scene.

BBC 'Inside Out South West' questions still unanswered

Other deficiencies in the NFCC Report

The report refers to the increased requirement for water overwhelming the water supply at times, but then fails to point out that ensuring adequate water supplies is a fundamental part of managing a fire. This should have been foreseen and planned for. You don't wait for the problem to arise before acting, as that delays effective firefighting and allows the fire to spread.

The NFCC report says that the escalation of the fire at around 10:18 translated in to “a make up for further resources including specialist appliances (ALPs)", but then claims they "arrived shortly afterwards”. According to details finally released under freedom of information legislation, no further appliances were ordered to the incident until 11:04, with the first arriving more than an hour after the escalation and the last two arriving 2 hours and 20 minutes after. The reinforcing ALPs arrived 90 minutes and nearly four hours after the escalation. Hardly “shortly afterwards”, and a significant delay to effective operations. Aerial appliances should have been requested much earlier and deployed much more effectively.

The NFCC report fails to detail the 81 learning points that DSFRS claim to have addressed. If firefighters and the public are to be reassured that DSFRS really has learnt lessons from the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire, the learning points and actions must be published.

The NFCC report has raised as many questions as it has answered

The Fire & Rescue Authority must get to the
bottom of the cover up and the failures

Revised proposals will still put lives in danger

I can understand why some may wish to celebrate the Chief Fire Officer's  revised proposals, but they should not do so too quickly. There is still much to be concerned about. Some people will have to wait longer for help to arrive, when help arrives it will often be less effective, and some cuts may be resurrected soon.

Topsham and Budleigh Salterton to close

It is not clear if the Topsham fire engine being moved permanently to Service HQ will be available at night. If an On Call crew cannot be recruited for the one eventually being moved to Middlemoor, and the one remaining at Service HQ is not crewed at night, then that would be a reduction of one fire engine during the day and two at night. It is possible that, on balance, these moves could improve response times in the Exeter area, but there are a lot of 'ifs'. The haste to close Topsham before an On Call crew is recruited at Middlemoor raises serious questions about the motive. 

The closure of Budleigh Salterton will be a loss of a fire engine in the area and it will increase some response times. Together with the removal of some second and all third fire engines at other stations this will be a total loss of nine front-line fire engines. That will adversely affect the service's resilience and ability to deal with periods of peak demand. Although they state that firefighters from Budleigh Salterton will be able to respond from Exmouth, it is likely that they will struggle to arrive in time to be able to respond. That could demotivate trained and experienced firefighters and result in some of them quitting the service.

Given the amount of inaccurate information and dubious risk modelling  provided during the consultation, 

it is difficult to have confidence in any of DSFRS's claims regarding these two station closures.

The threat remains for other stations

The future of Appledore, Ashburton, Colyton, Kingston, Porlock and Woolacombe is not guaranteed, the stations simply have a reprieve. The report says that they "will be subject to periodic review", which means the axe is still hanging over them. DSFRS had stopped actively recruiting at those stations long before the consultation, presumably to ensure that the stations' availability did not improve. The threat of review will not help recruitment and retention of staff. Of course that may be the intention, so that availability gets worse and can be used as a justification for closure in the future.

The Fire & Rescue Authority must give assurances that

no closures will take place without further public consultation.

The threat for Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton is more imminent, as firefighters are being bullied in to accepting new shift systems. DSFRS is effectively saying, agree to this or we will remove immediate response cover at night for people living in the Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton areas. 

A shabby way to treat dedicated staff and wholly irresponsible 

to use the safety of the public as a bargaining chip in staff negotiations.

This tactic suggests that DSFRS has learnt nothing from the disturbing inspection report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Perhaps not surprising when the Chief Fire Officer thinks bullying and harassment is OK, as long as you call it 'strong management'. 

The Fire & Rescue Authority must respect the public's views and guarantee that 
Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton will continue to have an immediate response crew day and night.

Inadequate and unsafe crewing

Then there is the deception of 'aggregate crewing', which is more accurately described as inadequate and unsafe crewing. I do understand why On Call Firefighters are frustrated that they cannot use their training and experience to help people when not enough of their colleagues are available to provide a minimum crew, but DSFRS should not take advantage of that frustration. 

For those with no fire service experience there is a need to understand the full implications of inadequate crewing. The officer in charge and the driver on a fire engine have specific tasks that are critical to safe and effective operations. That leaves the firefighters who arrive in the rear cab of the fire engine to attack the fire and carry out rescue work.

Having just one or no firefighters on a fire engine to

carry out sharp end rescues and firefighting is unacceptable

These rear cab images illustrate the stark deterioration in safety and effectiveness of DSFRS plans

A crew of 4 is barely safe and adequate

A crew of 3 is unsafe and inadequate

A crew of 2 is dangerous and ineffective

The advantage for the Chief Fire Officer is that the arrival of an inadequately crewed vehicle will allow him to stop the clock and claim he has met the response time target. Yet the reality will be that effective action to deal with the emergency will not start until a second fire engine has arrived from another more distant fire station.

It may also give the public the illusion of help arriving, but the reality will be that effective help is still several minutes away. The public may also become incensed when they realise that the two or three firefighters on the first vehicle are unable to take effective action.

If lives are in danger, firefighters will be forced to choose between having to wait for back up, with a strong likelihood that the victim or victims would not survive, or to ignore safety procedures and take unacceptable risks to try and rescue people. Most firefighters will feel compelled to attempt a rescue, which could cost the lives of both victim and firefighter. Responsible Chief Fire Officers have always refused to put their firefighters in that invidious position.

If the Fire & Rescue Authority decide to put firefighters in danger in this way, they must be honest about response times. A response time should only be recorded as met when at least four firefighters have arrived at an incident.

What are the true figures? 

It is also concerning that, once again, the report is missing important information and includes misleading and inaccurate figures.

A glaring omission, with regard to the financial position, is the amount of money that will be available from the council tax precept. This is integrally linked with these proposals and could mean none of the cuts need to happen. Consulting on a precept increase separately denied the public the opportunity of seeing what effect different precepts would have on the case for cuts.

No doubt the excuse will be that the precept consultation only closed two weeks ago and that the budget meeting is not until next month. However, that is no excuse for failing to show the implications of differing precept amounts on the proposals in this report.

Not only does the blatant attempt to deceive the public about the effect of the cuts continues in this report, but they have again manipulated the figures. This table in the report is not, as claimed, comparing 'As is' with options 6 & 7 "based on all fire appliances being available". It is dishonestly comparing poor availability of appliances now, with an idealised future where all appliances are available. That is deception, plain and simple.

In the original consultation document (see below) we were told that, based on all appliances being available, 'as is' (theoretical full availability in the consultation document) was an average of 7.61 fire deaths per year, but now they claim it is 7.99. Similarly, we were originally told that RTC deaths, with all fire appliances available, averaged 33.14 per year, but now they claim it is 33.72. DSFRS seem determined to manipulate the figures to make the cuts appear less damaging than they really are. The figures for option 7 are pure fantasy, as you cannot properly model the effect of roving fire engines.

Extract from the original consultation report

Removal of second and third fire engines will mean delayed responses

These fire engines may not be used as frequently as others, but they play an important part in ensuring proper fire cover. Without them, other fire engines from further away will need to be sent with inevitable delay that could cost lives.

Emergencies are random events and every year there will be several occasions when a call is received in a station's area whilst crews are already attending another incident. The fire stations with three fire engines are busier, so that will happen much more frequently. Without that third fire engine people will have to wait longer for help to arrive from another station. That will also have a knock on effect, as that creates a further gap in that area's protection.

The stations losing second fire engines may not be as busy, but simultaneous emergencies still occur with similar delays. Lynton's isolated location makes this a particular problem. Despite post-war austerity, and many less calls than today, Devon County Council recognised the risk in 1948 and decided that the station should have two fire engines. The 1952 flood tragedy illustrated how important that was, as the two crews were able to split up and save lives in different locations when crews from other stations could not reach the area. 

Chief Fire Officers and Councillors have continued to recognise the importance of keeping two fire engines at Lynton for over 50 years. It has often proved its worth. Yet now, that common sense and professional competence is tossed aside to save a little bit of money. 

It makes no sense to say that Frome will have their second fire engine available 24 hours a day 'due to its distance from other stations', but then permanently remove Lynton's second fire engine when it is even more remote. There are two fire stations with 3 fire engines within 7 miles of Frome. The nearest two fire engines to Lynton are each over 12 miles away and they have to travel on slower roads. If they are unavailable, then the next nearest help is over 18 miles away.

Roving fire engines ineffective and inefficient

To keep six roving fire engines on minimum crew will need 24 firefighters, plus others to cover leave, sickness and training. The chances of them being in the right location for the next emergency is slim, especially if prevention work dictates where they will be. As there is no indication that extra firefighters are to be recruited, there will clearly be a reduction in crewing elsewhere. That has safety implications and will delay responses elsewhere, but it is not explained in the report.

It is also an inefficient way to use 24+ firefighters. The On Call fire engines are rarely unavailable because none of the firefighters are available, it is often that they don't have someone available who is qualified to drive the fire engine or to take charge of an incident. Intelligent deployment of those 24 firefighters could see up to 24 extra fire engines available during the day, not just six. Similarly, they could also be carrying out four times more prevention work, whilst remaining available for any emergencies.

Variable fire appliance availability flawed

The claim that this will be based on risk is untrue. They are simply looking at call frequency in the past and gambling on likelihood in the future. 

The claims about fires being less serious during the day are half truths. National statistics for 2018/19 show that 8.6% of fire deaths in the home occurred between nine and eleven in the evening, yet 9.7% occurred between 9 and 11 in the morning. Similarly, fatalities in fire service attended road crashes between 3 and 5 in the morning amount to 4%, whilst between 3 and 5 in the afternoon they amount to 12.3%.

The risk of someone being trapped in a fire or crash is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year and exists in every part of Devon & Somerset. DSFRS does not have a crystal ball, they cannot predict when or where someone will need to be rescued or a fire, large or small, needs to be dealt with.

All resources must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.

Unfair Consultation Report

The report is rightly critical of the way the proposals were presented, but Opinion Research Services is wrong to claim that 95% opposition to the proposals is not a balanced picture of general public opinion. The simple truth is that people in Devon and Somerset are not easily manipulated. They saw through the spin and misinformation and resoundingly rejected the proposals.

It is a nonsense to suggest that forums or focus groups would provide a more balanced picture of public opinion. They are particularly unbalanced, as the only information provided to the attendees is in support of the proposed changes. The chances of someone being there with the necessary details and data to challenge unsubstantiated claims and inaccurate data is remote.

The way the report tries to dismiss petitions by saying they "can exaggerate general public sentiment if organised by motivated opponents" is disturbing. That may be their opinion, but it is disrespectful to both those who organised and those who signed the petition. Rather like telling people they were too stupid to know what they were voting for! 

Anyone who has ever organised a petition, or collected signatures for one, knows that it is not an easy task and that people don't sign if they are not convinced it represents their views. An indication of how strong a message these petitions are sending to the Fire & Rescue Authority is that a higher percentage of Devon & Somerset's population signed them than the percentage of the nation's population required to have a petition debated in Parliament. The 3,818 written responses, including 94 from councils and other organisations, was exceptionally high and reflects widespread opposition to the proposed cuts.

Now I understand that Opinion Research Services want to keep their fire & rescue service customers happy. Reports that show as much public support as opposition to proposals will do that, and those with majority support will suit customers even better. So a report in which they have to admit 95% of the responses from the public oppose the proposed cuts is not what their customer, Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service, would have wanted to see. 

I don't believe their recommendations for future consultations will achieve true balance. They seem more intended to limit discussion by giving the public a one sided picture that will make them more likely to support future proposals.

It was 'Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service' that tried to fool the public with false claims and misleading information. I should add that I don't believe their communications team should take the blame, as they can only work with the information and data provided by senior management.

Many good and honest people across Devon & Somerset campaigned to ensure the public realised
 this was not about improvement, but about poorly disguised and dangerous cuts. 

They should all be proud of their efforts, they have helped safeguard lives and property.

Senior officers continue to mislead during the consultation

False claims, inaccurate data and misleading statements

have undermined the consultation from the beginning 

Chief Fire Officer Lee Howell & Fire Authority Chair Sara Randall Johnson

Your Reality

"Not all emergencies are preventable, so if you need help

our plans will ensure that it takes longer for us to arrive,

creating a less safe world for you and your family, 

for your business and for your community."

To help anyone who has yet to complete their consultation response, here are some facts to set the record straight:

There are no low risk areas

Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service keep referring to low risk areas, but the risk to lives and property is no different in Barnstaple than it is in Bridgwater, no different in Exmouth than it is in Exeter, and no different in Porlock than it is in Plymouth. 

Call volume may vary, but the risk to people trapped in a fire or crash is the same wherever the fire or crash happens.

A quick and effective response is required right across Devon & Somerset

The modernisation claim is bogus

The service has changed considerably since the 1940s. Better equipment, training and procedures, but already less firefighters and fire engines available.

The service has been modernising continuously and is on a par with other 21st century fire & rescue services in the UK.

Councillors and independent inspections have monitored this modernisation and have found no serious inadequacies. That will change if the cuts go ahead.

The number of emergencies attended has risen significantly since the 1940s. There are over twice as many fires today and over five times more non-fire emergencies, such as road traffic collisions.

1958 figures were the earliest found for Devon & Somerset. For reference, national figures were lower in 1948 than in 1958.

Chief Fire Officers say no link

between resources and demand

The professional body representing Chief Fire Officers confirmed there is no link between resources and demand. That is why resources were not increased when demand increased by 500% and why they should not be cut now.

There has been no need to move fire stations because they are strategically located to ensure a quick and effective response, no matter where an emergency occurs. The proposals do not include any fire stations being moved, which confirms they must be in the right places.

The way we live has changed, but it has not removed the need for the fire & rescue service to arrive quickly, with adequate resources, when people or property are in danger.

Some causes of fire have been reduced or eliminated, but new ones emerge to replace them (battery chargers, tumble driers, e-cigarettes etc.).

Modern homes are not always safer,

these homes were just 9 years old

Legal duty deception

Claims that the fire & rescue service only has a legal duty to attend fires and road traffic collisions are false. The Fire & Rescue Services Act and the Civil Contingencies Act, which has been ignored in this consultation, place a duty on the service to respond to many other emergencies.

Similarly, the claim that they are only funded for fires and road traffic collisions is false. Core Government funding and Council Tax revenue is not specified for particular emergencies. Specific Government funding is additionally provided for urban search and rescue and the ambulance service fund the fire & rescue service's response to medical emergencies.

Important financial information missing

The consultation has failed to provide full costings. No figures have been provided to show how much of the saved money is to be reallocated to prevention or any other work.

No figures have been provided to show the anticipated saving from On-call firefighter savings, or how much money will actually be reallocated.

No details have been provided to show how the claimed capital savings will be achieved, or how that will affect annual revenue costs.

Devious modelling information

The modelling of the effects is incomplete and the results suggest it has not been carried out properly or honestly. They even admit to modifying the Fire Services Emergency Cover (FSEC) Toolkit, which was developed after extensive research and should not be manipulated.

Fire deaths, which are not in dwellings, the cost of property damage as a result of fires, and deaths at non-fire incidents, which are not road traffic collisions, have all been excluded. That has been done to give the impression that the consequences of these cuts will be less severe than they actually will be.

They have failed to show the modelling results for each station area affected by the changes. Not only an attempt to hide the worst effects, but they dishonestly claim they don't have that information (FSEC modelling can provide results from the whole service area right down to a very small geographical area).

Inappropriate manipulation of the modelling is the only plausible explanation for the significant differences between D&SF&RS modelling and modelling of similar changes in other fire and rescue services. Examples include:

D&SF&RS change of crewing at Barnstaple, Paignton and Exmouth results in 19 extra deaths. In another fire & rescue service, the change at just one station in a seaside town similar to Paignton, but with a slightly smaller population and fewer incidents, shows a difference of 23 deaths.

Removal of a second fire engine in another fire & rescue service showed 11 extra deaths in 100 years. D&SF&RS has failed to provide the figures, but a map in their analysis document appears to show, for removal of a second fire engine at a similar station, just one extra death in 1,000 years.

This is the same document, proclaimed to be "comprehensive" and to "set out an evidence base", which shows some response times increasing by no more than five minutes, when the nearest fire engine will be six miles further away!

The modelling information is inadequate and fundamentally flawed

No evidence that more prevention will save lives

D&SF&RS has claimed that more prevention work will save lives, but has provided no evidence to substantiate the claim. The limited modelling figures they have provided show that cuts to response will cost more lives. Proper modelling would show the cost in lives and property damage would be significant. We all hope that prevention work saves lives and prevents fires, but hoping it will is not enough.

It is reckless to make cuts that will cost lives when there is 

no guarantee that more prevention will save lives

Appalling misrepresentation

One of the most appalling misrepresentations concerns the use of this chart, which has been used to make utterly dishonest claims, such as "we have more fire engines than we need".

This is either a deliberate attempt to mislead, or the management team in D&SF&RS do not understand their responsibilities. A fire engine is not only of value when it is attending an incident. There is just as much value when it is sat in a fire station ready to respond quickly to the next emergency.

You can just imagine the reaction of a D&SF&RS fire safety officer visiting a factory complex and finding that all the fire extinguishers and all but one of the smoke detectors had been removed. The factory owner says, "We had more than we need. We never had more than one smoke detector go off and we have never needed a fire extinguisher".

That is the same ludicrous logic that underlies Devious & Secretive

Fire & Rescue Service's claim of 'having more fire engines than they need'

This BBC Journalist can work that out

"The fire service is a bit like an insurance policy. 99% of the time you don’t need 
or think about it, but when you do need them you really do." John Ayres, BBC Spotlight

But the leadership of D&SF&RS  is ignoring the
fundamental purpose of the service - Why?

Even more concerns after 'Safer Together' consultation live broadcast

If experienced fire service officers are confused, 

how can the public be expected to understand?

It really was depressing to listen to Sarah Allen and Joe Hassell provide inaccurate, misleading and evasive answers to questions during this broadcast. Sadly they are not the only ones, several people have reported the same problems when they asked D&SF&RS staff questions at the consultation events. 

Sarah Allen, Joe Hassell & Ellie Banner-Ball

Joe Hassell got off to a flying start by telling us that they needed to change because, “a lot of our station locations and the way our fire service was designed was essentially around the 1940s”. Not entirely accurate, but it was 1948 when most current fire station locations and fire engine allocations were first approved by the fire authorities and the Home Office.

However, his implied suggestion that things should have changed, but did not, is wrong. Since 1948, Chief Fire Officers and Fire Authorities regularly reviewed and refined arrangements, but found no justification for significant change. Inspections by Her Majesty's Fire Service Inspectorate, for nearly 60 years, and then peer reviews thereafter supported those views.

Joe Hassell was then completely inaccurate when he claimed that “the amount of fires and incidents have reduced drastically since then”, as they have significantly increased since 1948. This chart shows the national figures for dwelling fires (fires in the home) for 1951, the earliest available, and 2017/18, the latest available.

Source - Home Office records

Whilst it is true that the number of fires in the home has nearly halved in the UK since a peak in 1999, it is also true that the peak showed an increase from 1951 of over 250%! D&SF&RS claim the recent 49% reduction in dwelling fires justifies a cut in the number of fire stations and fire crews, so how big was the increase in fire stations and fire crews when there was a 250% increase? There was no increase! There are actually less fire crews now than there were in 1948. The reason is simple, there is not, and never has been, a connection between number of calls and the resources required.

"Fewer fires does not directly equal fewer firefighters. 

We provide a service dependent upon risk, not demand." 

Chief Fire Officers Association (now National Fire Chiefs Council)

Have you got direct evidence that prevention works?

Instead of answering this question from a member of the public accurately, by saying 'NO', Joe Hassell claimed, "We absolutely know that saves lives". Throughout the interview they kept telling us that their prevention work has cut the number of fires and fire deaths and that more prevention work will save more lives. That is not fact, it is wishful thinking. There is no direct evidence that prevention works.

Now I certainly hope that the prevention work I did during my service helped save lives and prevented fires, but I have no way of knowing if fires did not start, or lives were not lost, as a result of that work. What I do know, with absolute certainty, is that we did save lives at many of the fires and other emergencies we attended. 

It is clear that changes in clothing and furniture regulations, the change to safer forms of cooking, safer ways to heat our homes, and the big decrease in smoking, especially in buildings, have significantly cut the number of fires and fire deaths. They are the main reasons and they have little or nothing to do with prevention work carried out by fire & rescue services, as Sarah Allen claimed in the broadcast. 

She also said that they had been investing in community fire safety for over 20 years and proclaimed "we’ll save far more lives by doing prevention work". The statistics do not support that claim.

Tens of thousands of fire safety visits have had this effect on fire deaths in Devon & Somerset

Source - Home Office Fire and Rescue Service statistics

A lack of detailed information

We are frequently told that they are 'Reallocating resources' and 'will do more prevention', but we have not been told how much money will be reallocated for each option. We have not been given any details about how that money will be spent, which makes it impossible to judge the value of each option. It also means, if the cuts go ahead, that we won't know if the claimed prevention improvements were actually implemented.

Now according to Joe Hassell, 93% of homes now have smoke detectors. So D&SF&RS are going to close fire stations and remove fire engines, which will mean a slower response to every emergency in the areas affected, in the hope they can persuade the 7% to fit smoke detectors. That makes no sense.

A delay when your home is on fire, a delay when your business is on fire, a delay when your care home is on fire, a delay when you are trapped in a crashed car, a delay when you are trapped in machinery, a delay when you are trapped in floodwater, all in the hope that a few more people will have a smoke detector in their home.

It should be remembered that for every four fires in peoples homes in Devon & Somerset, there are two fires in other buildings, three vehicle fires, three secondary fires and twenty non-fire emergencies, such as road traffic collisions. The service rescues many more people from non-fire emergencies than they do from fires, and these all need a quick and effective response.

Inaccurate answer about statutory duty

I have to say I was astonished when Sarah Allen said, "we only have two statutory duties - to attend fires and to attend RTCs". For someone who says so much about prevention work, forgetting that prevention is a statutory duty is incredible. 

She seems to have forgotten that regulations made under the Fire & Rescue Services Act extended their duties to include a number of other non-fire emergencies. She also forgot their statutory duty in relation to all emergencies that threaten human welfare and the environment under the Civil Contingencies Act. 

Perhaps she should have read some Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Authority documents:

Source: Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Authority Corporate Plan

This extract featured in their Corporate Plan for several years and is still accurate today. Under the same heading, the Fire & Rescue Authority's responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 were also explained. 

It was also disingenuous to suggest that they are not funded for other emergencies. Core funding from Government and Council Taxpayers is for providing a fire & rescue service and has nothing to do with specific types of emergency. They also receive additional specific funding from Government for specialist rescue work and from the ambulance service for responding to medical emergencies.

Excluding certain emergencies from the data used in the consultation, and for the modelling, appears to be a deliberate attempt by Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service to mislead the public on the real effects of their proposals.

Modelling the effect of cuts

Another ludicrous claim from Joe Hassell was that if all 85 fire appliances (there are actually 121) had a wholetime crew it would barely save any extra lives. Anyone who knows anything about the FSEC modelling will know that you could only get such a result if you entered manipulated data and/or excluded some of the results. 

Modelling in another fire & rescue service, which was properly carried out and used the full results, showed that changing a fire station from day crewing to immediate response, the opposite of what D&SF&RS propose for Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton, would on average save an extra life every four years. That is not 'barely any' and is the effect for just one fire station.

In the same fire & rescue service, modelling the effects of removing a second fire engine from an on call fire station indicated an extra 11 deaths in 100 years. Yet for a similar station, in terms of number of calls and the area's population, D&SF&RS claim just 1 extra death in 1,000 years! That information is shown on the maps in the 'Analytical Comparison of Community Impacts from Service Delivery Operating Model' document, which is supposed to be the evidence base for these cuts.

Not only does this reinforce concerns that D&SF&RS has manipulated the input or output modelling data, or perhaps both, to make the cuts appear less harmful, but it confirms that they do have station level data. Yet in their response to a Freedom of Information request for full details of extra deaths and property damage in each station area affected, D&SF&RS claim they "don't have that information".  

The modelling tool provides results down to station level, so what they mean is they don't want to release that information. Without that detail it becomes impossible for the public, or the Fire & Rescue Authority, to properly compare the impact of the cuts in each affected station area with the claimed savings.

If they are willing to risk breaching the Freedom of Information Act again,
you have to wonder how bad those results are!

Some other inaccurate, misleading, evasive and
confusing answers during the interview

There were several inaccurate and misleading claims about risk - "risk is really low", "risk is at such a low level", "low risk area", "high risk area". This demonstrates a worrying failure to understand risk. D&SF&RS repeatedly misuse the term risk when they are actually talking about the frequency of calls. The risk for anyone trapped in a fire, or trapped in car crash is just as real as it always was and it is the same wherever they are. 

"If people comment on other stations we would have to do another consultation". Not true. "You can reach a final decision that was not one of the options put forward for consultation" (Consultation guidance from leading UK law firm Mills & Reeve).

We were told that modern cars and houses are safer, but that is misleading. People still get injured and trapped in modern cars and need to be rescued. When they are seriously injured, if they are not in hospital within the 'Golden Hour', their chances of survival quickly reduce. Modern houses still burn and sometimes much more quickly.

There were over 900 fires in people's homes in Devon & Somerset last year

and at 72 of them people had to be rescued.

Reserves are "not sat there waiting for a rainy day". Wrong, that is exactly what the primary purpose of reserves is. Every responsible public body has reserves for unexpected events that may require additional expenditure. D&SF&RS may have more than they need in reserves 'for a rainy day', but the answer was misleading.

"We are trying to get more day cover". Only crazy D&SF&RS logic could make this claim when their proposals will see up to 30 less fire engines available during the day.

"Some of the suggestions are to move appliances to different locations". Misleading, only one fire engine is to be moved to a different location. Sixteen others are being permanently removed.

They were asked "How much money will be reinvested in fire safety?" Their answer avoided saying how much. None of the consultation documents give that information either. Why is that information being kept secret?

We were told that removing wholetime cover at night at Barnstaple, Exmouth and Paignton would result in a "slightly longer response time at night". Misleading, adding five minutes to the response time to hundreds of emergencies is not 'slightly longer' when seconds count, especially if your life or property is at risk.

We were told that the "majority of fatalities are people who can’t escape by themselves" and "vulnerable people". Instead of doing more to ensure firefighters arrive quickly enough to save them, D&SF&RS is planning to arrive more slowly. Not only immoral, but making changes you know will impact more seriously on vulnerable groups is a breach of the Equality Act.  

"Will removing rural appliances mean longer response times". Another evasive answer about their response standard, which only covers the first fire engine's arrival time. He did not mention that building fires and road traffic collisions where people are trapped need at least two fire engines. The honest answer is, removing appliances will mean even longer response times for both first and second fire engines.

We were also told that "if it was just about money" they “could have made much bigger savings in a different way.” Confusing, and it raises two important points. 

1. If they had other ways to save money, why is the public being denied the opportunity to comment on those options?

2. The law firm Mills & Reeve advise that, if there is a need to make savings, the financial position must be clearly set out. Yet we have not been told exactly how much has to be saved and how much is being reallocated. Interestingly, they add that hiding financial reasons "behind other, more palatable, reasons to change a service risks your consultation being struck down as unlawful".

This consultation is riddled with inaccurate, contradicting and misleading information, false claims and a lack of detail. This broadcast confirms that asking D&SF&RS staff questions will only result in more of the same and they will end up even more confused. I think most people would expect much better from people earning over £75,000 a year. 

On the plus side, there was one important and accurate thing mentioned by Sarah Allen. Referring to incidents she said, "we don’t know when they are going to happen or what resources they are going to need in advance”. 

That is exactly why none of the fire stations should be closed

and none of the fire engines removed.

The consultation is not fit for purpose