Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service still living up to their new name

Well sorry Peter Bond, I don't think anyone believes that closing 8 fire stations, cutting 16 fire engines, 
cutting between 200 and 250 firefighter posts, mothballing 8 or 14 fire engines during the day, 
and reallocating just one fire engine will make anything better.

Vital information missing from Chief Fire Officer's report

The Chief Fire Officer's report to the Fire Authority mentions the Fire Services Emergency Cover Toolkit, which is used to model the effects of any resource changes, but he has not included the all important results. Used properly, the modelling can be used to compare the effects of each option with current figures for deaths and property damage, so that the consequences of change are fully understood. Figures can be produced to show increases or decreases for the service as a whole and for each station area.

Other Chief Fire Officers have tried to bury, or make difficult to understand, the extra death and increased property damage results from this modelling, but Lee Howell seems to be the first to try and keep them secret. It is not acceptable to hide them from the public and from Fire Authority Members.

The report also misleads by not giving the full figures for each station’s workload, which means the full extent of the consequences is hidden. Figures for incidents attended in other station areas, attendance at incidents as relief crew, standbys at other stations and co-responder calls should be included in all the tables. 

Much is made in the report of prevention activity, but no mention is made of how much prevention and community safety activity will be lost as a result of the cuts at affected stations. Attendance at community events, visits to schools etc., are valuable prevention and safety opportunities. That loss needs to be set against any gain that may, or may not, result from some of the changes. A significant increase in prevention activity may be hoped for, but the report is lacking in detail of how that will be achieved and at what cost.

Strange Logic 

Some of the claimed figures in the report seem illogical. For example, in option 1, they claim closing 8 fire stations and removing over 90 firefighter posts will save money. I understand that, but how will that also increase Fire Safety Checks by over 3,000? Saying “Potential increase” in Fire Safety Checks is not good enough, some detail and costings must be provided to support the figures. 

The concept of prevention and protection activity making everyone safer is an attractive one, but doing so by reducing response resources, and thereby increasing response times, is foolhardy. There is no evidence that increasing prevention and protection activity will save lives, but plenty of evidence that longer response times increase the number of deaths and the cost of property damage. We hope prevention will save lives, but it is not measurable. 

Wishing and hoping prevention will save lives is not 

justification for removing fire crews that do save lives.

Roving can only work with an accurate crystal ball

Option 6 would see six additional 'roving' fire engines during the day, although details of how they will be used are sketchy. They talk about moving them to areas where, for example, "we typically have a number of accidents at particular times of the day on particular roads". They even admitted on Facebook that they don't have a crystal ball, but arrogantly claim, "robust analysis is the next best thing". It is not. No amount of analysis will tell them where and when the next emergency will be. It only tells them about incidents they have attended in the past. Fires and accidents can occur anywhere and at anytime, so there will be many more occasions when 'roving' fire engines are not nearby, than occasions when they will be.

The number of calls deception

The Chief Fire Officer claims that less calls justifies these cuts, but fails to mention that demand has never been used to determine the number of fire engines required. If fire service resources had been increased as calls increased then, even allowing for recent reductions, the service would have far more resources than it does now. 

Proper resource allocation is based on having a spread of resources to ensure a speedy and effective response to every emergency call, a speedy and effective response to assistance calls for larger incidents, and to ensure a high volume of calls in an area can be attended simultaneously. Severe weather events often result in numerous calls at the same time and climate change is increasing the scale and frequency of such events. 

Demand is only a factor in determining if a fire engine needs to be crewed by On Call Firefighters, for lower demand, or by Wholetime Firefighters for higher demand.

Every fire station is attending more emergency calls than when Chief Fire Officers, Councillors and the Home Office first approved the establishment of the current stations in 1948. Since then, despite emergency calls increasing significantly, before dropping back to levels well above those in 1948, the number of front-line fire engines in Devon & Somerset has never been increased. They have only ever been reduced.

There are around 3 fires in people's homes and over 50 other fires and emergencies every day in Devon and Somerset. There is no way of knowing where the next one will be, so resources must be maintained across the area.

Each 'X' on this map represents a fire engine permanently removed, or not available during the day, under option 5 of Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service's latest scheme.

It is also concerning that in the report, in interviews and on social media, unsubstantiated claims and statements are being made by Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service. Spin and speculation should have no place in an organisation that professes to be honest, open and accountable. 

Incredibly, when I pointed out that they were misusing the term 'risk', they admitted my definition was right. So why do they keep talking about 'low risk' when all they really mean is that an area or station has less incidents than other areas. The risk of anyone losing their life in a fire or crash, or losing their home or business, is the same wherever they are. 

What Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service is really saying is, "if there are lots of emergencies in your area, then we will attend quickly, but if there are not, then we won't. To ensure we take longer to get to areas with less emergencies, we will remove your nearest fire station or fire engines from that station". 

About as responsible as a motorist saying, "I wear my seat belt on that road because there were ten serious crashes on it last year, but I don't wear it on this road because there were only two".   

This lengthy report is packed with statistics, some helpful some not, but it is missing crucial information.

The Fire Authority must not keep that information secret, it must be released before the consultation.

An Honest Fire & Rescue Service or a

The cover up continues

Those concerned with the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter on 28 October 2016, which resulted in the loss of the historic Royal Clarence Hotel, have been trying to get answers. A Freedom of Information request for copies of incident logs and other recorded information was submitted last September by respected fire safety consultant Alan Cox. Instead of providing copies of the documents within the required 20 working days, the request was met with delays and excuses.

One disturbing excuse in November was, “the main subject experts are no longer employees.” You don’t need former employees to copy reports or to redact exempt material from documents and records. They went on to say, “one of them is coming in next week to assist”. Assist with what, removing details from the reports, adding detail that should have been recorded at the time, or altering the reports to cover up failures? Such actions would not only be inappropriate, they would be illegal.

Finally, at the beginning of this month, one document has now been provided. Not, however, scans of the original Fire Ground Event & Decision Log that was completed during the incident, but a typed transcript. When questioned, the sender is only able to say that she "understands" it to be "a direct copy”. Following the earlier reference to a former employee coming in to assist, concerns are heightened that, instead of an exact copy, this is just a sanitised version.

Despite Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s claim to be open, responsible and accountable, they have redacted all the names in the log. It is not acceptable to shield publicly employed managers from public scrutiny by misusing exemptions that are designed to protect people from unreasonable intrusion in to their private lives. That was never the intention of the Data Protection Act, or the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act.  

We are only talking about the names of these publicly employed officials, not their age, home address, or other genuinely personal data. These names would be made public if there was a court case, inquest or public inquiry, so why not now? Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service happily publish the names of personnel in press releases and on their website for positive stories, so why are they hiding these names? There is no justification, and this secrecy only reinforces concerns that, instead of learning from their failings, they want to cover them up.

Fire Ground Event & Decision Log

So, what does the only document provided so far tell us? It tells us that plans for the Royal Clarence Hotel were being sent to the incident at 08:24, which is more than 3 hours after the first fire engine arrived. That raises several questions, including why were plans for this historic building, with a significant life risk, not available on fire engines and why had they not been requested much earlier? It also suggests that someone still had concerns about the fire affecting the hotel, even though reports indicate that, at the same time, the hotel was not being properly checked for fire spread and that resources were being released from the incident.

Even more concerning, at 09:45, the record of the inter-agency meeting says that the fire was “now contained” and that the risk assessment had “taken into account fire spread at roof level”. Crucially, there was no mention of fire spreading to the Royal Clarence Hotel in the list of risks still being considered. 

Astonishingly, at 09:40, it records just 2 breathing apparatus sets, one aerial appliance and one firefighting jet in use. Photos then show that, shortly after, the aerial appliance was no longer in action. It is also unclear, if this is an exact copy of the original, how the 09:40 log entry was recorded after the 09:45 entry.

Despite the apparent confidence that the fire was contained and would not spread, less than 20 minutes later, large volumes of smoke are rising from the roof of the Royal Clarence Hotel. It is also more than five hours after firefighters were first called to the incident. Resources that had been released are called back and additional resources have to be requested. Firefighters universally regard having to ask for additional resources, after they have been sent away, as a cardinal sin indicating poor decision making and assessment. Exactly what resources had been released from the incident too early is not shown in this log, which is why it is important for the control room log to be produced. 

International Fire Protection magazine

The missing documents

It is quite clear that the control room log is one of the documents that they don’t want to be made public. Eight months after these documents were requested, they are now making the excuse that the Monitoring Officer needs to consider if they are exempt under section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act. This is undoubtedly a last-ditch attempt to keep this information from public scrutiny, as that section is primarily intended to protect information about sensitive Government negotiations. For other public bodies it is only about disclosure that might prejudice “the effective conduct of public affairs.”

Key to legitimate use of this exemption is the public interest test. It is painfully obvious that understanding why there was such a catastrophic failure at this incident, despite the magnificent work of so many firefighters, is very much in the public interest. Not least to ensure such failures do not occur in the future. Section 36 is not there to frustrate scrutiny, or to serve the personal interest of individuals.

If section 36 is used to withhold information, then it will effectively be an admission that 

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service has something to hide

It is rather like a drink driver refusing to be tested. They know they are over the limit, the police know they are over the limit, the courts know they are over the limit, but they just want to hide exactly how much over the limit they are.

The fake review of the Cathedral Yard fire

In January, Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service announced a review of the Cathedral Yard fire by the National Fire Chiefs Council, which they claimed would provide “an independent view from people who understand operational tactics”. However, the review by West Midlands Fire & Rescue Service has been told by Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service to only review the methods used to compile the original report. A much criticised report that had recommendations for others, but none for Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service.

By mentioning operational tactics, it appears they hoped to give the impression that it was a full review of the incident. However, as Assistant Chief Fire Officer Peter Bond confirmed in correspondence with the Fire Brigades Union, “It is not a review of the actual incident or any operational tactics.” He also says that the review was requested "following allegations that were made in the media", but the limitations they have imposed prevent any review of tactics and actions that are at the heart of those allegations.

Mr Bond also refused to allow the FBU to be involved with the process, other than to accompany any FBU member who wanted support when interviewed. Another indication that they did not want a full and open investigation. Surprising and worrying when Mr Bond is supposed to be the Director of Service Improvement.

The FBU raised several concerns after the fire, but none of these were included in the whitewash report. Other professionals and the victims of the fire share those concerns. I understand that the review team carried out interviews with selected personnel at the end of March, but a review report has yet to appear. It will be interesting to see if West Midlands Chief Fire Officer Phil Loach decides to support a fellow Chief Fire Officer's whitewash, or if he will make it clear that he is unable to properly address the many genuine concerns about the handling of this fire.

This is not about finding people to punish for any failings, it is about understanding what went wrong, why it went wrong, and taking action to stop similar failures in the future. 

If the Fire & Rescue Authority genuinely cares about public safety it will make the requested documents public

and ensure that a full and truly independent investigation is carried out.

Claiming these values is meaningless
when your actions demonstrate the opposite

Your firefighters and the public deserve better