Office for National Statistics ignores true value of our fire & rescue services

Yesterday's report, “Activities, spending and productivity in the Fire and Rescue Services since 2009”, from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), clearly shows how distorted thinking is undermining our fire & rescue services.

They claim to be independent of politics, but the claim looks somewhat suspect when the report suggests that cuts have improved productivity. They also claim to be the “recognised national statistical institute of the UK”. Well perhaps they are competent when it comes to business statistics, but when it comes to the fire & rescue service they clearly don’t have a clue.

They apply a simplistic business test of looking at inputs (cost of provision) and outputs (quantity produced), which they perceive for fire & rescue to be operational and prevention activity. They then crudely claim, because activity cuts are not as bad as staff cuts, that productivity has improved.

Home Office figures

The fundamental schoolboy error in this approach is that fire & rescue is not a business, but a form of insurance that both reduces mishaps and disasters, and minimises their effects when they do occur. If they properly assessed outputs, they would assess the financial benefit of lives not being lost and property not being destroyed as a result of FRS activity. Sadly, something this national statistical institute appears incapable of doing.

Now it may be difficult, but proper research could identify the value of lives and property saved at incidents by the FRS. Identifying the value of lives and property saved by prevention activity, i.e. losses avoided because incidents were avoided, may be more challenging, but a “recognised national statistical institute” ought to be able to estimate this. Yet they have not even tried to do so.

The real value of the service is what is saved and prevented, not how many incidents or inspections are carried out. I have no doubt that if these fundamental outputs were properly calculated, then the service would be shown to be very productive and very good value.

Of course, that would also show that cuts to the service are counterproductive, with the cost of the consequences being much greater than the actual saving on service provision. The ONS may consider themselves to be non-political, but their inept assessment is helping austerity politicians to falsely claim damaging cuts as productivity improvements.

If the ONS want their statistics on fire & rescue to be taken seriously, then they need to properly value the full benefit that fire and rescue services contribute to public safety and the economy.     

Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service blunders on

It seems that Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s leadership is incapable of learning from their mistakes, or of complying with the law. They are clearly desperate to cover up their failings and poor decision making by any means possible.

This week a ruling confirmed that they failed to comply with the Freedom of Information Act, and last week there was another move in the continuing cover up regarding the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel in Exeter.

No risk assessments for Really Inadequate Vehicle policy

The Information Commissioner has now ruled that Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service breached sections 10 and 17 of the Freedom of Information Act, in relation to a request for information about their decision to provide some communities with less capable fire engines.

The Commissioner has ordered D&SF&RS to provide missing and redacted information within 35 days and, if they fail to do so, the matter could be referred to the High Court to be dealt with as a contempt of court.

Included in the information they have been trying to keep secret are the risk assessments that should have been completed before they replaced well equipped fire engines with vehicles that are far less effective.

D&SF&RS regularly claim that resources are being matched to risk, but they refuse to provide copies of their risk assessments. In particular, how they assessed the risk of replacing well equipped fire engines with vehicles that are far less effective.

So, either they have not carried out proper risk assessments, 

or there are serious risks they don’t want the public or firefighters to know about.

Royal Clarence Hotel

The Information Commissioner has yet to rule on D&SF&RS’s failure to provide information that would allow scrutiny of their actions at the Cathedral Yard fire.  The information was requested last September. Now, presumably to try and placate the Commissioner, they have belatedly released a version of the Fire Control Incident Log. Unfortunately, as so much of the detail useful for scrutiny has been redacted, it tells us very little.

Information they want to keep secret includes: 

• Details of which fire engines were sent, when they were sent, how long they took to arrive, when they left the incident, and how many firefighters were on them.
• Significant detail in messages between the control room and the incident that give details of the extent of the fire and what action the crews were taking.
• Some assistance messages redacted completely and detail missing in others.
• The names of officers taking decisions and in overall command of the incident at different times.

The public and firefighters have legitimate concerns

BBC Inside Out South West

To justify keeping this information secret they are misusing an exemption in the legislation that is intended to protect information related to law enforcement. It is quite ludicrous to claim that, for example, information on what time the fire engine from Dawlish was sent to the incident “would, or would be likely to, prejudice” .. “the exercise by any public authority of its functions for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of an accident.” 

It would be laughable, if this were not such a serious matter.

Clearly aware how weak their justification is, they have produced an additional document in which they try to suggest that this information would help “those with malicious intent” and is necessary to “protect the Service and wider society from potential crime”. Once again utterly ludicrous. Hiding this information is not in the public interest, but the Chief Fire Officer must think it is in his interest.

Having worked with security sensitive information and discussed policies with the police, security services and the Cabinet Office, I fully understand the need to be cautious about information that might be useful to terrorists. 

However, information on how the service managed, or mismanaged, 

a fire nearly three years ago is of no use to terrorists whatsoever.

Mr Nobody did it

Those who are parents will be familiar with children’s denials when they have done something wrong. It seems D&SF&RS are following that example by removing names from documents, so that we have no idea who was responsible for anything.

They did eventually disclose the name of the most senior person responsible for two of the vehicle related documents, but not for all of them. So, for no legitimate reason, the names of some project managers and of those who reviewed or approved the reports are kept secret.

Astonishingly they claim this was because they “believed that there may be inappropriate contact and naming of these individuals in the media, due to the way in which its responses had been used in the past. Disclosure of the information about these third parties could clearly have very detrimental consequences.”

They don’t explain what “detrimental consequences” or “inappropriate contact” they are referring to, or provide any evidence to support their claim about past use of their responses, or even why they describe their own employees as "third parties". Critics of the changes have not contacted any individual employee - appropriately, or inappropriately. 

It all points to the real reason being that they don’t like 

anyone asking awkward questions or criticising their decisions

D&SF&RS need to understand that if they require their managers to make inaccurate and misleading claims in interviews, press releases and on social media, in an effort to justify dangerous cuts to the service, those claims have to be challenged. Do they really expect us to believe that fire service managers, who have risked life and limb, are going to dissolve in to tears when someone challenges what they said, or asks difficult questions?

D&SF&RS put them in that position, not those campaigning to stop dangerous changes. 

In the case of the Royal Clarence Hotel log, all the names have been removed from the released Fire Control log. So, apparently, we are not to be told who was in overall charge of the incident at any stage. 

You have to wonder, if they did such a good job, why they don’t want their names associated with the incident.

The exemptions in the legislation were never intended to allow people, who are paid by taxpayers to protect the public, to hide their activities under a cloak of anonymity. D&SF&RS claims to be open, honest and accountable, yet these actions demonstrate it is not. Compounding the secrecy and cover up by trying to deceive the Information Commissioner with spurious claims is equally irresponsible.

Until the fire authority ensures this information is put fully in the public domain,

the service will sadly remain the Devious & Secretive Fire & Rescue Service.

An Honest Fire & Rescue Service or a

The cover up continues

Those concerned with the failures at the Cathedral Yard fire in Exeter on 28 October 2016, which resulted in the loss of the historic Royal Clarence Hotel, have been trying to get answers. A Freedom of Information request for copies of incident logs and other recorded information was submitted last September by respected fire safety consultant Alan Cox. Instead of providing copies of the documents within the required 20 working days, the request was met with delays and excuses.

One disturbing excuse in November was, “the main subject experts are no longer employees.” You don’t need former employees to copy reports or to redact exempt material from documents and records. They went on to say, “one of them is coming in next week to assist”. Assist with what, removing details from the reports, adding detail that should have been recorded at the time, or altering the reports to cover up failures? Such actions would not only be inappropriate, they would be illegal.

Finally, at the beginning of this month, one document has now been provided. Not, however, scans of the original Fire Ground Event & Decision Log that was completed during the incident, but a typed transcript. When questioned, the sender is only able to say that she "understands" it to be "a direct copy”. Following the earlier reference to a former employee coming in to assist, concerns are heightened that, instead of an exact copy, this is just a sanitised version.

Despite Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s claim to be open, responsible and accountable, they have redacted all the names in the log. It is not acceptable to shield publicly employed managers from public scrutiny by misusing exemptions that are designed to protect people from unreasonable intrusion in to their private lives. That was never the intention of the Data Protection Act, or the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act.  

We are only talking about the names of these publicly employed officials, not their age, home address, or other genuinely personal data. These names would be made public if there was a court case, inquest or public inquiry, so why not now? Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service happily publish the names of personnel in press releases and on their website for positive stories, so why are they hiding these names? There is no justification, and this secrecy only reinforces concerns that, instead of learning from their failings, they want to cover them up.

Fire Ground Event & Decision Log

So, what does the only document provided so far tell us? It tells us that plans for the Royal Clarence Hotel were being sent to the incident at 08:24, which is more than 3 hours after the first fire engine arrived. That raises several questions, including why were plans for this historic building, with a significant life risk, not available on fire engines and why had they not been requested much earlier? It also suggests that someone still had concerns about the fire affecting the hotel, even though reports indicate that, at the same time, the hotel was not being properly checked for fire spread and that resources were being released from the incident.

Even more concerning, at 09:45, the record of the inter-agency meeting says that the fire was “now contained” and that the risk assessment had “taken into account fire spread at roof level”. Crucially, there was no mention of fire spreading to the Royal Clarence Hotel in the list of risks still being considered. 

Astonishingly, at 09:40, it records just 2 breathing apparatus sets, one aerial appliance and one firefighting jet in use. Photos then show that, shortly after, the aerial appliance was no longer in action. It is also unclear, if this is an exact copy of the original, how the 09:40 log entry was recorded after the 09:45 entry.

Despite the apparent confidence that the fire was contained and would not spread, less than 20 minutes later, large volumes of smoke are rising from the roof of the Royal Clarence Hotel. It is also more than five hours after firefighters were first called to the incident. Resources that had been released are called back and additional resources have to be requested. Firefighters universally regard having to ask for additional resources, after they have been sent away, as a cardinal sin indicating poor decision making and assessment. Exactly what resources had been released from the incident too early is not shown in this log, which is why it is important for the control room log to be produced. 

International Fire Protection magazine

The missing documents

It is quite clear that the control room log is one of the documents that they don’t want to be made public. Eight months after these documents were requested, they are now making the excuse that the Monitoring Officer needs to consider if they are exempt under section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act. This is undoubtedly a last-ditch attempt to keep this information from public scrutiny, as that section is primarily intended to protect information about sensitive Government negotiations. For other public bodies it is only about disclosure that might prejudice “the effective conduct of public affairs.”

Key to legitimate use of this exemption is the public interest test. It is painfully obvious that understanding why there was such a catastrophic failure at this incident, despite the magnificent work of so many firefighters, is very much in the public interest. Not least to ensure such failures do not occur in the future. Section 36 is not there to frustrate scrutiny, or to serve the personal interest of individuals.

If section 36 is used to withhold information, then it will effectively be an admission that 

Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service has something to hide

It is rather like a drink driver refusing to be tested. They know they are over the limit, the police know they are over the limit, the courts know they are over the limit, but they just want to hide exactly how much over the limit they are.

The fake review of the Cathedral Yard fire

In January, Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service announced a review of the Cathedral Yard fire by the National Fire Chiefs Council, which they claimed would provide “an independent view from people who understand operational tactics”. However, the review by West Midlands Fire & Rescue Service has been told by Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service to only review the methods used to compile the original report. A much criticised report that had recommendations for others, but none for Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service.

By mentioning operational tactics, it appears they hoped to give the impression that it was a full review of the incident. However, as Assistant Chief Fire Officer Peter Bond confirmed in correspondence with the Fire Brigades Union, “It is not a review of the actual incident or any operational tactics.” He also says that the review was requested "following allegations that were made in the media", but the limitations they have imposed prevent any review of tactics and actions that are at the heart of those allegations.

Mr Bond also refused to allow the FBU to be involved with the process, other than to accompany any FBU member who wanted support when interviewed. Another indication that they did not want a full and open investigation. Surprising and worrying when Mr Bond is supposed to be the Director of Service Improvement.

The FBU raised several concerns after the fire, but none of these were included in the whitewash report. Other professionals and the victims of the fire share those concerns. I understand that the review team carried out interviews with selected personnel at the end of March, but a review report has yet to appear. It will be interesting to see if West Midlands Chief Fire Officer Phil Loach decides to support a fellow Chief Fire Officer's whitewash, or if he will make it clear that he is unable to properly address the many genuine concerns about the handling of this fire.

This is not about finding people to punish for any failings, it is about understanding what went wrong, why it went wrong, and taking action to stop similar failures in the future. 

If the Fire & Rescue Authority genuinely cares about public safety it will make the requested documents public

and ensure that a full and truly independent investigation is carried out.

Claiming these values is meaningless
when your actions demonstrate the opposite

Your firefighters and the public deserve better